When I obtained this leave I was at Chattanooga, having gone there again to make preparations to have the troops of Thomas in the southern part of Tennessee co-operate with Sherman’s movement in Mississippi.  I directed Thomas, and Logan who was at Scottsboro, Alabama, to keep up a threatening movement to the south against J. E. Johnston, who had again relieved Bragg, for the purpose of making him keep as many troops as possible there.

I learned through Confederate sources that Johnston had already sent two divisions in the direction of Mobile, presumably to operate against Sherman, and two more divisions to Longstreet in East Tennessee.  Seeing that Johnston had depleted in this way, I directed Thomas to send at least ten thousand men, besides Stanley’s division which was already to the east, into East Tennessee, and notified Schofield, who was now in command in East Tennessee, of this movement of troops into his department and also of the reinforcements Longstreet had received.  My object was to drive Longstreet out of East Tennessee as a part of the preparations for my spring campaign.

About this time General Foster, who had been in command of the Department of the Ohio after Burnside until Schofield relieved him (21), advised me that he thought it would be a good thing to keep Longstreet just where he was; that he was perfectly quiet in East Tennessee, and if he was forced to leave there, his whole well-equipped army would be free to go to any place where it could effect the most for their cause.  I thought the advice was good, and, adopting that view, countermanded the orders for pursuit of Longstreet.

On the 12th of February I ordered Thomas to take Dalton and hold it, if possible; and I directed him to move without delay.  Finding that he had not moved, on the 17th I urged him again to start, telling him how important it was, that the object of the movement was to co-operate with Sherman, who was moving eastward and might be in danger.  Then again on the 21st, he not yet having started, I asked him if he could not start the next day.  He finally got off on the 22d or 23d.  The enemy fell back from his front without a battle, but took a new position quite as strong and farther to the rear.  Thomas reported that he could not go any farther, because it was impossible with his poor teams, nearly starved, to keep up supplies until the railroads were repaired.  He soon fell back.

Schofield also had to return for the same reason.  He could not carry supplies with him, and Longstreet was between him and the supplies still left in the country.  Longstreet, in his retreat, would be moving towards his supplies, while our forces, following, would be receding from theirs.  On the 2d of March, however, I learned of Sherman’s success, which eased my mind very much.  The next day, the 3d, I was ordered to Washington.