Upon the raising of the siege of Knoxville I, of course, informed the authorities at Washington—­the President and Secretary of War—­of the fact, which caused great rejoicing there.  The President especially was rejoiced that Knoxville had been relieved (18) without further bloodshed.  The safety of Burnside’s army and the loyal people of East Tennessee had been the subject of much anxiety to the President for several months, during which time he was doing all he could to relieve the situation; sending a new commander (19) with a few thousand troops by the way of Cumberland Gap, and telegraphing me daily, almost hourly, to “remember Burnside,” “do something for Burnside,” and other appeals of like tenor.  He saw no escape for East Tennessee until after our victory at Chattanooga.  Even then he was afraid that Burnside might be out of ammunition, in a starving condition, or overpowered:  and his anxiety was still intense until he heard that Longstreet had been driven from the field.

Burnside followed Longstreet only to Strawberry Plains, some twenty miles or more east, and then stopped, believing that Longstreet would leave the State.  The latter did not do so, however, but stopped only a short distance farther on and subsisted his army for the entire winter off East Tennessee.  Foster now relieved Burnside.  Sherman made disposition of his troops along the Tennessee River in accordance with instructions.  I left Thomas in command at Chattanooga, and, about the 20th of December, moved my headquarters to Nashville, Tennessee.

Nashville was the most central point from which to communicate with my entire military division, and also with the authorities at Washington.  While remaining at Chattanooga I was liable to have my telegraphic communications cut so as to throw me out of communication with both my command and Washington.

Nothing occurred at Nashville worthy of mention during the winter, (20) so I set myself to the task of having troops in positions from which they could move to advantage, and in collecting all necessary supplies so as to be ready to claim a due share of the enemy’s attention upon the appearance of the first good weather in the spring.  I expected to retain the command I then had, and prepared myself for the campaign against Atlanta.  I also had great hopes of having a campaign made against Mobile from the Gulf.  I expected after Atlanta fell to occupy that place permanently, and to cut off Lee’s army from the West by way of the road running through Augusta to Atlanta and thence south-west.  I was preparing to hold Atlanta with a small garrison, and it was my expectation to push through to Mobile if that city was in our possession:  if not, to Savannah; and in this manner to get possession of the only east and west railroad that would then be left to the enemy.  But the spring campaign against Mobile was not made.