On the 4th of November Longstreet left our front with about fifteen thousand troops, besides Wheeler’s cavalry, five thousand more, to go against Burnside.  The situation seemed desperate, and was more aggravating because nothing could be done until Sherman should get up.  The authorities at Washington were now more than ever anxious for the safety of Burnside’s army, and plied me with dispatches faster than ever, urging that something should be done for his relief.  On the 7th, before Longstreet could possibly have reached Knoxville, I ordered Thomas peremptorily to attack the enemy’s right, so as to force the return of the troops that had gone up the valley.  I directed him to take mules, officers’ horses, or animals wherever he could get them to move the necessary artillery.  But he persisted in the declaration that he could not move a single piece of artillery, and could not see how he could possibly comply with the order.  Nothing was left to be done but to answer Washington dispatches as best I could; urge Sherman forward, although he was making every effort to get forward, and encourage Burnside to hold on, assuring him that in a short time he should be relieved.  All of Burnside’s dispatches showed the greatest confidence in his ability to hold his position as long as his ammunition held out.  He even suggested the propriety of abandoning the territory he held south and west of Knoxville, so as to draw the enemy farther from his base and make it more difficult for him to get back to Chattanooga when the battle should begin.  Longstreet had a railroad as far as Loudon; but from there to Knoxville he had to rely on wagon trains.  Burnside’s suggestion, therefore, was a good one, and it was adopted.  On the 14th I telegraphed him: 

“Sherman’s advance has reached Bridgeport.  His whole force will be ready to move from there by Tuesday at farthest.  If you can hold Longstreet in check until he gets up, or by skirmishing and falling back can avoid serious loss to yourself and gain time, I will be able to force the enemy back from here and place a force between Longstreet and Bragg that must inevitably make the former take to the mountain-passes by every available road, to get to his supplies.  Sherman would have been here before this but for high water in Elk River driving him some thirty miles up that river to cross.”

And again later in the day, indicating my plans for his relief, as follows: 

“Your dispatch and Dana’s just received.  Being there, you can tell better how to resist Longstreet’s attack than I can direct.  With your showing you had better give up Kingston at the last moment and save the most productive part of your possessions.  Every arrangement is now made to throw Sherman’s force across the river, just at and below the mouth of Chickamauga Creek, as soon as it arrives.  Thomas will attack on his left at the same time, and together it is expected to carry Missionary Ridge, and from there push a force on to the railroad between