Johnston heard of the surrender of Vicksburg almost as soon as it occurred, and immediately fell back on Jackson.  On the 8th of July Sherman was within ten miles of Jackson and on the 11th was close up to the defences of the city and shelling the town.  The siege was kept up until the morning of the 17th, when it was found that the enemy had evacuated during the night.  The weather was very hot, the roads dusty and the water bad.  Johnston destroyed the roads as he passed and had so much the start that pursuit was useless; but Sherman sent one division, Steele’s, to Brandon, fourteen miles east of Jackson.

The National loss in the second capture of Jackson was less than one thousand men, killed, wounded and missing.  The Confederate loss was probably less, except in captured.  More than this number fell into our hands as prisoners.

Medicines and food were left for the Confederate wounded and sick who had to be left behind.  A large amount of rations was issued to the families that remained in Jackson.  Medicine and food were also sent to Raymond for the destitute families as well as the sick and wounded, as I thought it only fair that we should return to these people some of the articles we had taken while marching through the country.  I wrote to Sherman:  “Impress upon the men the importance of going through the State in an orderly manner, abstaining from taking anything not absolutely necessary for their subsistence while travelling.  They should try to create as favorable an impression as possible upon the people.”  Provisions and forage, when called for by them, were issued to all the people, from Bruinsburg to Jackson and back to Vicksburg, whose resources had been taken for the supply of our army.  Very large quantities of groceries and provisions were so issued.

Sherman was ordered back to Vicksburg, and his troops took much the same position they had occupied before—­from the Big Black to Haines’ Bluff.  Having cleaned up about Vicksburg and captured or routed all regular Confederate forces for more than a hundred miles in all directions, I felt that the troops that had done so much should be allowed to do more before the enemy could recover from the blow he had received, and while important points might be captured without bloodshed.  I suggested to the General-in-chief the idea of a campaign against Mobile, starting from Lake Pontchartrain.  Halleck preferred another course.  The possession of the trans-Mississippi by the Union forces seemed to possess more importance in his mind than almost any campaign east of the Mississippi.  I am well aware that the President was very anxious to have a foothold in Texas, to stop the clamor of some of the foreign governments which seemed to be seeking a pretext to interfere in the war, at least so far as to recognize belligerent rights to the Confederate States.  This, however, could have been easily done without wasting troops in western Louisiana and eastern Texas, by sending a garrison at once to Brownsville on the Rio Grande.