On the night of the 13th Johnston sent the following dispatch to Pemberton at Edward’s station:  “I have lately arrived, and learn that Major-General Sherman is between us with four divisions at Clinton.  It is important to establish communication, that you may be reinforced.  If practicable, come up in his rear at once.  To beat such a detachment would be of immense value.  All the troops you can quickly assemble should be brought.  Time is all-important.”  This dispatch was sent in triplicate, by different messengers.  One of the messengers happened to be a loyal man who had been expelled from Memphis some months before by Hurlbut for uttering disloyal and threatening sentiments.  There was a good deal of parade about his expulsion, ostensibly as a warning to those who entertained the sentiments he expressed; but Hurlbut and the expelled man understood each other.  He delivered his copy of Johnston’s dispatch to McPherson who forwarded it to me.

Receiving this dispatch on the 14th I ordered McPherson to move promptly in the morning back to Bolton, the nearest point where Johnston could reach the road.  Bolton is about twenty miles west of Jackson.  I also informed McClernand of the capture of Jackson and sent him the following order:  “It is evidently the design of the enemy to get north of us and cross the Big Black, and beat us into Vicksburg.  We must not allow them to do this.  Turn all your forces towards Bolton station, and make all dispatch in getting there.  Move troops by the most direct road from wherever they may be on the receipt of this order.”

And to Blair I wrote:  “Their design is evidently to cross the Big Black and pass down the peninsula between the Big Black and Yazoo rivers.  We must beat them.  Turn your troops immediately to Bolton; take all the trains with you.  Smith’s division, and any other troops now with you, will go to the same place.  If practicable, take parallel roads, so as to divide your troops and train.”

Johnston stopped on the Canton road only six miles north of Jackson, the night of the 14th.  He sent from there to Pemberton dispatches announcing the loss of Jackson, and the following order: 

“As soon as the reinforcements are all up, they must be united to the rest of the army.  I am anxious to see a force assembled that may be able to inflict a heavy blow upon the enemy.  Can Grant supply himself from the Mississippi?  Can you not cut him off from it, and above all, should he be compelled to fall back for want of supplies, beat him.”

The concentration of my troops was easy, considering the character of the country.  McPherson moved along the road parallel with and near the railroad.  McClernand’s command was, one division (Hovey’s) on the road McPherson had to take, but with a start of four miles.  One (Osterhaus) was at Raymond, on a converging road that intersected the other near Champion’s Hill; one (Carr’s) had to pass over the same road with Osterhaus, but being back at Mississippi Springs, would not be detained by it; the fourth (Smith’s) with Blair’s division, was near Auburn with a different road to pass over.  McClernand faced about and moved promptly.  His cavalry from Raymond seized Bolton by half-past nine in the morning, driving out the enemy’s pickets and capturing several men.