Rosecrans did not start in pursuit till the morning of the 5th and then took the wrong road.  Moving in the enemy’s country he travelled with a wagon train to carry his provisions and munitions of war.  His march was therefore slower than that of the enemy, who was moving towards his supplies.  Two or three hours of pursuit on the day of battle, without anything except what the men carried on their persons, would have been worth more than any pursuit commenced the next day could have possibly been.  Even when he did start, if Rosecrans had followed the route taken by the enemy, he would have come upon Van Dorn in a swamp with a stream in front and Ord holding the only bridge; but he took the road leading north and towards Chewalla instead of west, and, after having marched as far as the enemy had moved to get to the Hatchie, he was as far from battle as when he started.  Hurlbut had not the numbers to meet any such force as Van Dorn’s if they had been in any mood for fighting, and he might have been in great peril.

I now regarded the time to accomplish anything by pursuit as past and, after Rosecrans reached Jonesboro, I ordered him to return.  He kept on to Ripley, however, and was persistent in wanting to go farther.  I thereupon ordered him to halt and submitted the matter to the general-in-chief, who allowed me to exercise my judgment in the matter, but inquired “why not pursue?” Upon this I ordered Rosecrans back.  Had he gone much farther he would have met a greater force than Van Dorn had at Corinth and behind intrenchments or on chosen ground, and the probabilities are he would have lost his army.

The battle of Corinth was bloody, our loss being 315 killed, 1,812 wounded and 232 missing.  The enemy lost many more.  Rosecrans reported 1,423 dead and 2,225 prisoners.  We fought behind breastworks, which accounts in some degree for the disparity.  Among the killed on our side was General Hackelman.  General Oglesby was badly, it was for some time supposed mortally, wounded.  I received a congratulatory letter from the President, which expressed also his sorrow for the losses.

This battle was recognized by me as being a decided victory, though not so complete as I had hoped for, nor nearly so complete as I now think was within the easy grasp of the commanding officer at Corinth.  Since the war it is known that the result, as it was, was a crushing blow to the enemy, and felt by him much more than it was appreciated at the North.  The battle relieved me from any further anxiety for the safety of the territory within my jurisdiction, and soon after receiving reinforcements I suggested to the general-in-chief a forward movement against Vicksburg.

On the 23d of October I learned of Pemberton’s being in command at Holly Springs and much reinforced by conscripts and troops from Alabama and Texas.  The same day General Rosecrans was relieved from duty with my command, and shortly after he succeeded Buell in the command of the army in Middle Tennessee.  I was delighted at the promotion of General Rosecrans to a separate command, because I still believed that when independent of an immediate superior the qualities which I, at that time, credited him with possessing, would show themselves.  As a subordinate I found that I could not make him do as I wished, and had determined to relieve him from duty that very day.