Beauregard, however, was reinforced by Van Dorn immediately after Shiloh with 17,000 men.  Interior points, less exposed, were also depleted to add to the strength at Corinth.  With these reinforcements and the new regiments, Beauregard had, during the month of May, 1862, a large force on paper, but probably not much over 50,000 effective men.  We estimated his strength at 70,000.  Our own was, in round numbers, 120,000.  The defensible nature of the ground at Corinth, and the fortifications, made 50,000 then enough to maintain their position against double that number for an indefinite time but for the demoralization spoken of.

On the 30th of April the grand army commenced its advance from Shiloh upon Corinth.  The movement was a siege from the start to the close.  The National troops were always behind intrenchments, except of course the small reconnoitring parties sent to the front to clear the way for an advance.  Even the commanders of these parties were cautioned, “not to bring on an engagement.”  “It is better to retreat than to fight.”  The enemy were constantly watching our advance, but as they were simply observers there were but few engagements that even threatened to become battles.  All the engagements fought ought to have served to encourage the enemy.  Roads were again made in our front, and again corduroyed; a line was intrenched, and the troops were advanced to the new position.  Cross roads were constructed to these new positions to enable the troops to concentrate in case of attack.  The National armies were thoroughly intrenched all the way from the Tennessee River to Corinth.

For myself I was little more than an observer.  Orders were sent direct to the right wing or reserve, ignoring me, and advances were made from one line of intrenchments to another without notifying me.  My position was so embarrassing in fact that I made several applications during the siege to be relieved.

General Halleck kept his headquarters generally, if not all the time, with the right wing.  Pope being on the extreme left did not see so much of his chief, and consequently got loose as it were at times.  On the 3d of May he was at Seven Mile Creek with the main body of his command, but threw forward a division to Farmington, within four miles of Corinth.  His troops had quite a little engagement at Farmington on that day, but carried the place with considerable loss to the enemy.  There would then have been no difficulty in advancing the centre and right so as to form a new line well up to the enemy, but Pope was ordered back to conform with the general line.  On the 8th of May he moved again, taking his whole force to Farmington, and pushed out two divisions close to the rebel line.  Again he was ordered back.  By the 4th of May the centre and right wing reached Monterey, twelve miles out.  Their advance was slow from there, for they intrenched with every forward movement.  The left wing moved up again on the 25th of May and intrenched itself close to the enemy.  The creek with the marsh before described, separated the two lines.  Skirmishers thirty feet apart could have maintained either line at this point.