been ordered to report to me.  General Buell was on his way from Nashville with 40,000 veterans.  On the 19th of March he was at Columbia, Tennessee, eighty-five miles from Pittsburg.  When all reinforcements should have arrived I expected to take the initiative by marching on Corinth, and had no expectation of needing fortifications, though this subject was taken into consideration.  McPherson, my only military engineer, was directed to lay out a line to intrench.  He did so, but reported that it would have to be made in rear of the line of encampment as it then ran.  The new line, while it would be nearer the river, was yet too far away from the Tennessee, or even from the creeks, to be easily supplied with water, and in case of attack these creeks would be in the hands of the enemy.  The fact is, I regarded the campaign we were engaged in as an offensive one and had no idea that the enemy would leave strong intrenchments to take the initiative when he knew he would be attacked where he was if he remained.  This view, however, did not prevent every precaution being taken and every effort made to keep advised of all movements of the enemy.

Johnston’s cavalry meanwhile had been well out towards our front, and occasional encounters occurred between it and our outposts.  On the 1st of April this cavalry became bold and approached our lines, showing that an advance of some kind was contemplated.  On the 2d Johnston left Corinth in force to attack my army.  On the 4th his cavalry dashed down and captured a small picket guard of six or seven men, stationed some five miles out from Pittsburg on the Corinth road.  Colonel Buckland sent relief to the guard at once and soon followed in person with an entire regiment, and General Sherman followed Buckland taking the remainder of a brigade.  The pursuit was kept up for some three miles beyond the point where the picket guard had been captured, and after nightfall Sherman returned to camp and reported to me by letter what had occurred.

At this time a large body of the enemy was hovering to the west of us, along the line of the Mobile and Ohio railroad.  My apprehension was much greater for the safety of Crump’s landing than it was for Pittsburg.  I had no apprehension that the enemy could really capture either place.  But I feared it was possible that he might make a rapid dash upon Crump’s and destroy our transports and stores, most of which were kept at that point, and then retreat before Wallace could be reinforced.  Lew.  Wallace’s position I regarded as so well chosen that he was not removed.

At this time I generally spent the day at Pittsburg and returned to Savannah in the evening.  I was intending to remove my headquarters to Pittsburg, but Buell was expected daily and would come in at Savannah.  I remained at this point, therefore, a few days longer than I otherwise should have done, in order to meet him on his arrival.  The skirmishing in our front, however, had been so continuous from about the 3d of April that I did not leave Pittsburg each night until an hour when I felt there would be no further danger before the morning.