Now that there was no longer a chance for the cavalry to turn the enemy’s left, our attention was directed to keeping up the deception of Lee, and on the afternoon of the 28th Hancock’s corps withdrew to a line nearer the head of the bridge, the cavalry drawing back to a position on his right.  From now on, all sorts of devices and stratagems were practiced—­anything that would tend to make the Confederates believe we were being reinforced, while Hancock was preparing for a rapid return to Petersburg at the proper time.  In order to delude the enemy still more after night-fall of the 28th I sent one of my divisions to the south side of the James, first covering the bridgeway with refuse hay to keep the tramp of the horses from being heard.  After daylight the next morning, I marched this division back again on foot, in full view of the enemy, to create the impression of a continuous movement large bodies of infantry to the north side, while the same time Kautz was made to skirmish with the enemy on our extreme right.  These various artifices had the effect intended, for by the evening of the 29th Lee had transferred all his infantry to the north bank of the James, except three divisions, and all his cavalry save one.

The morning of the 30th had been fixed upon to explode the mine and assault the enemy’s works, so after dark on the evening of the 29th Hancock hastily but quietly withdrew his corps to the south side to take part in the engagement which was to succeed the explosion, and I was directed to follow Hancock.  This left me on the north side of the river confronting two-thirds of Lee’s army in a perilous position, where I could easily be driven into Curl’s Neck and my whole command annihilated.  The situation, therefore, was not a pleasant one to contemplate, but it could not be avoided.  Luckily the enemy did not see fit to attack, and my anxiety was greatly relieved by getting the whole command safely across the bridge shortly after daylight, having drawn in the different brigades successively from my right.  By 10 o’clock on the morning of the 3oth my leading division was well over toward the left of our army in front of Petersburg, marching with the purpose to get around the enemy’s right flank during the operations that were to succeed the mine explosion, but when I reached General Meade’s headquarters I found that lamentable failure had attended the assault made when the enemy’s works were blown up in the morning.  Blunder after blunder had rendered the assault abortive, and all the opportunities opened by our expedition to the north side were irretrievably lost, so General Meade at once arrested the movement of the cavalry.