Very respectfully, your ob’t srv’t, D. C. Buell, Brigadier-General
Comd’g.

P. S.—­The steamers will leave here at 12 o’clock to-night.

General Smith said this order was nonsense.  But I told him it was better to obey it.  The General replied, “of course I must obey,” and said his men were embarking as fast as they could.  I went on up to Nashville and inspected the position taken by Nelson’s troops.  I did not see Buell during the day, and wrote him a note saying that I had been in Nashville since early morning and had hoped to meet him.  On my return to the boat we met.  His troops were still east of the river, and the steamers that had carried Nelson’s division up were mostly at Clarksville to bring Smith’s division.  I said to General Buell my information was that the enemy was retreating as fast as possible.  General Buell said there was fighting going on then only ten or twelve miles away.  I said:  “Quite probably; Nashville contained valuable stores of arms, ammunition and provisions, and the enemy is probably trying to carry away all he can.  The fighting is doubtless with the rear-guard who are trying to protect the trains they are getting away with.”  Buell spoke very positively of the danger Nashville was in of an attack from the enemy.  I said, in the absence of positive information, I believed my information was correct.  He responded that he “knew.”  “Well,” I said, “I do not know; but as I came by Clarksville General Smith’s troops were embarking to join you.”

Smith’s troops were returned the same day.  The enemy were trying to get away from Nashville and not to return to it.

At this time General Albert Sidney Johnston commanded all the Confederate troops west of the Alleghany Mountains, with the exception of those in the extreme south.  On the National side the forces confronting him were divided into, at first three, then four separate departments.  Johnston had greatly the advantage in having supreme command over all troops that could possibly be brought to bear upon one point, while the forces similarly situated on the National side, divided into independent commands, could not be brought into harmonious action except by orders from Washington.

At the beginning of 1862 Johnston’s troops east of the Mississippi occupied a line extending from Columbus, on his left, to Mill Springs, on his right.  As we have seen, Columbus, both banks of the Tennessee River, the west bank of the Cumberland and Bowling Green, all were strongly fortified.  Mill Springs was intrenched.  The National troops occupied no territory south of the Ohio, except three small garrisons along its bank and a force thrown out from Louisville to confront that at Bowling Green.  Johnston’s strength was no doubt numerically inferior to that of the National troops; but this was compensated for by the advantage of being sole commander of all the Confederate forces at the West,