My course in following so close was dictated by a thorough knowledge of the topography of the country and a familiarity with its roads, bypaths, and farm-houses, gained with the assistance of Mr. Crutchfield; and sure my column was heading in the right direction, though night had fallen I thought that an active pursuit would almost certainly complete the destruction of Bragg’s army.  When General Grant came by my bivouac at the crossing of Chickamauga Creek on the 26th, he realized what might have been accomplished had the successful assault on Missionary Ridge been supplemented by vigorous efforts on the part of some high officers, who were more interested in gleaning that portion of the battle-field over which my command had passed than in destroying a panic-stricken enemy.

Although it cannot be said that the result of the two days’ operations was reached by the methods which General Grant had indicated in his instructions preceding the battle, yet the general outcome was unquestionably due to his genius, for the manoeuvring of Sherman’s and Hooker’s commands created the opportunity for Thomas’s corps of the Army of the Cumberland to carry the ridge at the centre.  In directing Sherman to attack the north end of the ridge, Grant disconcerted Bragg—­who was thus made to fear the loss of his depot of supplies at Chickamauga Station—­and compelled him to resist stoutly; and stout resistance to Sherman meant the withdrawal of the Confederates from Lookout Mountain.  While this attack was in process of execution advantage was taken of it by Hooker in a well-planned and well-fought battle, but to my mind an unnecessary one, for our possession of Lookout was the inevitable result that must follow from Sherman’s threatening attitude.  The assault on Missionary Ridge by Granger’s and Palmer’s corps was not premeditated by Grant, he directing only the line at its base to be carried, but when this fell into our hands the situation demanded our getting the one at the top also.

I took into the action an effective force of 6,000, and lost 123 officers and 1,181 men killed and wounded.  These casualties speak louder than words of the character of the fight, and plainly tell where the enemy struggled most stubbornly for these figures comprise one-third the casualties of the entire body of Union troops —­Sherman’s and all included.  My division captured 1,762 prisoners and, in all, seventeen pieces of artillery.  Six of these guns I turned over with caissons complete; eleven were hauled off the field and appropriated by an officer of high rank—­General Hazen.  I have no disposition to renew the controversy which grew out of this matter.  At the time the occurrence took place I made the charge in a plain official report, which was accepted as correct by the corps and army commanders, from General Granger up to General Grant.  General Hazen took no notice of this report then, though well aware of its existence.  Nearly a quarter of a century later, however, he endeavored to justify his retention of the guns by trying to show that his brigade was the first to reach the crest of Missionary Ridge, and that he was therefore entitled to them.  This claim of being the first to mount the ridge is made by other brigades than Hazen’s, with equal if not greater force, so the absurdity of his deduction is apparent: