The necessity of protecting our left was most apparent, and the next day the drifting in that direction was to be continued.  This movement in the presence of the enemy, who at all points was actively seeking an opportunity to penetrate our line and interpose a column between its right and left, was most dangerous.  But the necessity for shifting the army to the left was obvious, hence only the method by which it was undertaken is open to question.  The move was made by the flank in the face of an exultant foe superior in numbers, and was a violation of a simple and fundamental military principle.  Under such circumstances columns naturally stretch out into attenuated lines, organizations become separated, and intervals occur, all of which we experienced; and had the orders for the movement been construed properly I doubt if it could have been executed without serious danger.  Necessity knows no law, however, and when all the circumstances of this battle are fully considered it is possible that justification may be found for the manoeuvres by which the army was thus drifted to the left.  We were in a bad strait unquestionably, and under such conditions possibly the exception had to be applied rather than the rule.

At daylight on the morning of the 20th a dense fog obscured everything; consequently both armies were passive so far as fighting was concerned.  Rosecrans took advantage of the inaction to rearrange his right, and I was pulled back closer to the widow Glenn’s house to a strong position, where I threw together some rails and logs as barricades, but I was disconnected from the troops on my left by a considerable interval.  Here I awaited the approach of the enemy, but he did not disturb me, although about 9 o’clock in the forenoon he had opened on our extreme left with musketry fire and a heavy cannonade.  Two hours later it was discovered by McCook that the interval between the main army and me was widening, and he ordered me to send Laiboldt’s brigade to occupy a portion of the front that had been covered by Negley’s division.  Before getting this brigade into place, however, two small brigades of Davis’s division occupied the ground, and I directed Laiboldt to form in column of regiments on the crest of a low ridge in rear of Carlin’s brigade, so as to prevent Davis’s right flank from being turned.  The enemy was now feeling Davis strongly, and I was about sending for Lytle’s and Bradley’s brigades when I received an order to move these rapidly to the, extreme left of the army to the assistance of General Thomas.  I rode hastily back toward their position, but in the meanwhile, they had been notified by direct orders from McCook, and were moving out at a double-quick toward the Lafayette road.  By this time the enemy had assaulted Davis furiously in front and flank, and driven him from his line, and as the confused mass came back, McCook ordered Laiboldt to charge by deploying to the front.  This he did through Davis’s broken ranks, but