I saw the men standing in knots talking in the most excited manner.  No officer seemed to be giving any directions.  The soldiers had their muskets, but no ammunition, while there were tons of it close at hand.  I heard some of the men say that the enemy had come out with knapsacks, and haversacks filled with rations.  They seemed to think this indicated a determination on his part to stay out and fight just as long as the provisions held out.  I turned to Colonel J. D. Webster, of my staff, who was with me, and said:  “Some of our men are pretty badly demoralized, but the enemy must be more so, for he has attempted to force his way out, but has fallen back:  the one who attacks first now will be victorious and the enemy will have to be in a hurry if he gets ahead of me.”  I determined to make the assault at once on our left.  It was clear to my mind that the enemy had started to march out with his entire force, except a few pickets, and if our attack could be made on the left before the enemy could redistribute his forces along the line, we would find but little opposition except from the intervening abatis.  I directed Colonel Webster to ride with me and call out to the men as we passed:  “Fill your cartridge-boxes, quick, and get into line; the enemy is trying to escape and he must not be permitted to do so.”  This acted like a charm.  The men only wanted some one to give them a command.  We rode rapidly to Smith’s quarters, when I explained the situation to him and directed him to charge the enemy’s works in his front with his whole division, saying at the same time that he would find nothing but a very thin line to contend with.  The general was off in an incredibly short time, going in advance himself to keep his men from firing while they were working their way through the abatis intervening between them and the enemy.  The outer line of rifle-pits was passed, and the night of the 15th General Smith, with much of his division, bivouacked within the lines of the enemy.  There was now no doubt but that the Confederates must surrender or be captured the next day.

There seems from subsequent accounts to have been much consternation, particularly among the officers of high rank, in Dover during the night of the 15th.  General Floyd, the commanding officer, who was a man of talent enough for any civil position, was no soldier and, possibly, did not possess the elements of one.  He was further unfitted for command, for the reason that his conscience must have troubled him and made him afraid.  As Secretary of War he had taken a solemn oath to maintain the Constitution of the United States and to uphold the same against all its enemies.  He had betrayed that trust.  As Secretary of War he was reported through the northern press to have scattered the little army the country had so that the most of it could be picked up in detail when secession occurred.  About a year before leaving the Cabinet he had removed arms from northern