through traffic the moment Fort Henry became ours.  Fort Donelson was the gate to Nashville—­a place of great military and political importance—­and to a rich country extending far east in Kentucky.  These two points in our possession the enemy would necessarily be thrown back to the Memphis and Charleston road, or to the boundary of the cotton states, and, as before stated, that road would be lost to them for through communication.

The designation of my command had been changed after Halleck’s arrival, from the District of South-east Missouri to the District of Cairo, and the small district commanded by General C. F. Smith, embracing the mouths of the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers, had been added to my jurisdiction.  Early in January, 1862, I was directed by General McClellan, through my department commander, to make a reconnoissance in favor of Brigadier-General Don Carlos Buell, who commanded the Department of the Ohio, with headquarters at Louisville, and who was confronting General S. B. Buckner with a larger Confederate force at Bowling Green.  It was supposed that Buell was about to make some move against the enemy, and my demonstration was intended to prevent the sending of troops from Columbus, Fort Henry or Donelson to Buckner.  I at once ordered General Smith to send a force up the west bank of the Tennessee to threaten forts Heiman and Henry; McClernand at the same time with a force of 6,000 men was sent out into west Kentucky, threatening Columbus with one column and the Tennessee River with another.  I went with McClernand’s command.  The weather was very bad; snow and rain fell; the roads, never good in that section, were intolerable.  We were out more than a week splashing through the mud, snow and rain, the men suffering very much.  The object of the expedition was accomplished.  The enemy did not send reinforcements to Bowling Green, and General George H. Thomas fought and won the battle of Mill Springs before we returned.

As a result of this expedition General Smith reported that he thought it practicable to capture Fort Heiman.  This fort stood on high ground, completely commanding Fort Henry on the opposite side of the river, and its possession by us, with the aid of our gunboats, would insure the capture of Fort Henry.  This report of Smith’s confirmed views I had previously held, that the true line of operations for us was up the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers.  With us there, the enemy would be compelled to fall back on the east and west entirely out of the State of Kentucky.  On the 6th of January, before receiving orders for this expedition, I had asked permission of the general commanding the department to go to see him at St. Louis.  My object was to lay this plan of campaign before him.  Now that my views had been confirmed by so able a general as Smith, I renewed my request to go to St. Louis on what I deemed important military business.  The leave was granted, but not graciously.  I had known General Halleck but very slightly in the old army, not having met him either at West Point or during the Mexican war.  I was received with so little cordiality that I perhaps stated the object of my visit with less clearness than I might have done, and I had not uttered many sentences before I was cut short as if my plan was preposterous.  I returned to Cairo very much crestfallen.