48.  Qu.  Suppose the legislature passed their word for any private banker, and regularly visited his books, would not money lodged in his bank be therefore reckoned more secure?

49.  Qu.  In a country where the legislative body is not fit to be trusted, what security can there be for trusting any one else?

50.  Qu.  If it be not ridiculous to question whether the pubic can find cash to circulate bills of a limited value when private bankers are supposed to find enough to circulate them to an unlimited value?

51.  Qu.  Whether the united stock of a nation be not the best security?  And whether anything but the ruin of the State can produce a national bankruptcy?

52.  Qu.  Whether the total sum of the public treasure, power, and wisdom, all co-operating, be not most likely to establish a bank of credit, sufficient to answer the ends, relieve the wants, and satisfy the scruples of all people?

53.  Qu.  Whether those hazards that in a greater degree attend private banks can be admitted as objections against a public one?

54.  Qu.  Whether that which is an objection to everything be an objection to anything; and whether the possibility of an abuse be not of that kind?

55.  Qu.  Whether, in fact, all things are not more or less abused, and yet notwithstanding such abuse, whether many things are not upon the whole expedient and useful?

56.  Qu.  Whether those things that are subject to the most general inspection are not the least subject to abuse?

57.  Qu.  Whether, for private ends, it may not be sometimes expedient to object novelty to things that have been often tried, difficulty to the plainest things, and hazard to the safest?

58.  Qu.  Whether some men will not be apt to argue as if the question was between money and credit, and not (as in fact it is) which ought to be preferred, private credit or public credit?

59.  Qu.  Whether they will not prudently overlook the evils felt, or to be feared, on one side?

60.  Qu.  Whether, therefore, those that would make an impartial judgment ought not to be on their guard, keeping both prospects always in view, balancing the inconveniencies on each side and considering neither absolutely?

61.  Qu.  Whether wilful mistakes, examples without a likeness, and general addresses to the passions are not often more successful than arguments?

62.  Qu.  Whether there be not an art to puzzle plain cases as well as to explain obscure ones?

63.  Qu.  Whether private men are not often an over-match for the public; want of weight being made up for by activity?

64.  Qu.  If we suppose neither sense nor honesty in our leaders or representatives, whether we are not already undone, and so have nothing further to fear?

65.  Qu.  Suppose a power in the government to hurt the pubic by means of a national bank, yet what should give them the will to do this?  Or supposing a will to do mischief, yet how could a national bank, modelled and administered by Parliament, put it in their power?