the future expansion of European influence in the Continents of Europe and Asia, the Imperial Japanese Government should or should not hesitate to employ force to check the movement before this occurrence.  Now is the most opportune moment for Japan to quickly solve the Chinese Question.  Such an opportunity will not occur for hundreds of years to come.  Not only is it Japan’s divine duty to act now, but present conditions in China favour the execution of such a plan.  We should by all means decide and act at once.  If our authorities do not avail themselves of this rare opportunity, great difficulty will surely be encountered in future in the settlement of this Chinese Question.  Japan will be isolated from the European Powers after the war, and will be regarded by them with envy and jealousy just as Germany is now regarded.  Is it not then a vital necessity for Japan to solve at this very moment the Chinese Question?

No one—­not even those who care nothing for politics—­can deny that there is in this document an astounding disclosure of the mental attitude of the Japanese not only towards their enemies but towards their friends as well.  They trust nobody, befriend nobody, envy nobody; they content themselves with believing that the whole world may in the not distant future turn against them.  The burden of their argument swings just as much against their British ally as against Germany and Austria; and the one and only matter which preoccupies Japanese who make it their business to think about such things is to secure that Japan shall forestall Europe in seizing control of China.  It is admitted in so many words that it is too early to know who is to triumph in the gigantic European struggle; it is also admitted that Germany will forever be the enemy.  At the same time it is expected, should the issue of the struggle be clearcut and decisive in favour of the Allies, that a new three-Power combination formed by England, France and Russia may be made to operate against Japan.  Although the alliance with England, twice renewed since 1902, should occupy as important a place in the Far East as the Entente between England and France occupies in Europe, not one Japanese in a hundred knows or cares anything about such an arrangement; and even if he has knowledge of it, he coolly assigns to his country’s major international commitment a minimum and constantly diminishing importance.  In his view the British Alliance is nothing but a piece of paper which may be consumed in the great bonfire now shedding such a lurid light over the world.  What is germane to the matter is his own plan, his own method of taking up arms in a sea of troubles.  The second part of the Black Dragon Society’s Memorandum, pursuing the argument logically and inexorably and disclosing traces of real political genius, makes this unalterably clear.

Having established clearly the attitude of Japan towards the world—­and more particularly towards the rival political combinations now locked together in a terrible death-struggle, this second part of the Memorandum is concerned solely with China and can be broken into two convenient sections.  The first section is constructive—­the plan for the reconstruction of China is outlined in terms suited to the Japanese genius.  This part begins with an illuminating piece of rhetoric.