For the time being, however, two dissimilar circumstances demanded caution:  first, the enthusiasm which the Japanese democracy, fed by a highly excited press, exhibited towards the Young China which had been so largely grounded in the Tokio schools and which had carried out the Revolution:  secondly—­and far more important—­the deep, abiding and ineradicable animosity which Japanese of all classes felt for the man who had come out of the contest head and shoulders above everybody else—­Yuan Shih-kai.  These two remarkable features ended by completely thrusting into the background during the period 1911-1914 every other element in Japanese statesmanship; and of the two the second must be counted the decisive one.  Dating back to Korea, when Yuan Shih-kai’s extraordinary diplomatic talents constantly allowed him to worst his Japanese rivals and to make Chinese counsels supreme at the Korean Court up to the very moment when the first shots of the war of 1894 were fired, this ancient dislike, which amounted to a consuming hatred, had become a fixed idea.  Restrained by the world’s opinion during the period prior to the outbreak of the world-war as well as by the necessity of acting financially in concert with the other Powers, it was not until August, 1914, that the longed-for opportunity came and that Japan prepared to act in a most remarkable way.

The campaign against Kiaochow was unpopular from the outset among the Japanese public because it was felt that they were not legitimately called upon to interest themselves in such a remote question as the balance of power among European nations, which was what British warfare against Germany seemed to them to be.  Though some ill-will was felt against Germany for the part played by her in the intervention of 1895, it must not be forgotten that just as the Japanese navy is the child of the British navy, so is the Japanese army the child of the German army—­and that Japanese army chiefs largely control Japan.  These men were averse from “spoiling their army” in a contest which did not interest them.  There was also the feeling abroad that England by calling upon her Ally to carry out the essential provisions of her Alliance had shown that she had the better part of a bargain, and that she was exploiting an old advantage in a way which could not fail to react adversely on Japan’s future world’s relationships.  Furthermore, it is necessary to underline the fact that official Japan was displeased by the tacit support an uninterested British Foreign Office had consistently given to the Yuan Shih-kai regime.  That the Chinese experiment was looked upon in England more with amusement than with concern irritated the Japanese—­more particularly as the British Foreign Office was issuing in the form of White Papers documents covering Yuan Shih-kai’s public declarations as if they were contributions to contemporary history.  Thus in the preceding year (1913) under the nomenclature of “affairs in China” the text of a dementi regarding the President of China’s Imperial aspirations had been published,—­a document which Japanese had classified as a studied lie, and as an act of presumption because its wording showed that its author intended to keep his back turned on Japan.  The Dictator had declared:—­