U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

This reached Sherman on September 20th.

On the 25th of September Sherman reported to Washington that Hood’s troops were in his rear.  He had provided against this by sending a division to Chattanooga and a division to Rome, Georgia, which was in the rear of Hood, supposing that Hood would fall back in the direction from which he had come to reach the railroad.  At the same time Sherman and Hood kept up a correspondence relative to the exchange of prisoners, the treatment of citizens, and other matters suitable to be arranged between hostile commanders in the field.  On the 27th of September I telegraphed Sherman as follows: 

CITY POINT, VA., September 27, 1864—­10.30 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL SHERMAN: 

I have directed all recruits and new troops from the Western States to be sent to Nashville, to receive their further orders from you. * * *

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

On the 29th Sherman sent Thomas back to Chattanooga, and afterwards to Nashville, with another division (Morgan’s) of the advanced army.  Sherman then suggested that, when he was prepared, his movements should take place against Milledgeville and then to Savannah.  His expectation at that time was, to make this movement as soon as he could get up his supplies.  Hood was moving in his own country, and was moving light so that he could make two miles to Sherman’s one.  He depended upon the country to gather his supplies, and so was not affected by delays.

As I have said, until this unexpected state of affairs happened, Mobile had been looked upon as the objective point of Sherman’s army.  It had been a favorite move of mine from 1862, when I first suggested to the then commander-in-chief that the troops in Louisiana, instead of frittering away their time in the trans-Mississippi, should move against Mobile.  I recommended this from time to time until I came into command of the army, the last of March 1864.  Having the power in my own hands, I now ordered the concentration of supplies, stores and troops, in the department of the Gulf about New Orleans, with a view to a move against Mobile, in support of, and in conjunction with, the other armies operating in the field.  Before I came into command, these troops had been scattered over the trans-Mississippi department in such a way that they could not be, or were not, gotten back in time to take any part in the original movement; hence the consideration, which had caused Mobile to be selected as the objective point for Sherman’s army to find his next base of supplies after having cut loose from Atlanta, no longer existed.