not so favorable for the operations to follow its completion.  The position of the two lines at that point were only about a hundred yards apart with a comparatively deep ravine intervening.  In the bottom of this ravine the work commenced.  The position was unfavorable in this particular:  that the enemy’s line at that point was re-entering, so that its front was commanded by their own lines both to the right and left.  Then, too, the ground was sloping upward back of the Confederate line for a considerable distance, and it was presumable that the enemy had, at least, a detached work on this highest point.  The work progressed, and on the 23d of July the mine was finished ready for charging; but I had this work of charging deferred until we were ready for it.

On the 17th of July several deserters came in and said that there was great consternation in Richmond, and that Lee was coming out to make an attack upon us the object being to put us on the defensive so that he might detach troops to go to Georgia where the army Sherman was operating against was said to be in great trouble.  I put the army commanders, Meade and Butler, on the lookout, but the attack was not made.

I concluded, then, a few days later, to do something in the way of offensive movement myself, having in view something of the same object that Lee had had.  Wright’s and Emory’s corps were in Washington, and with this reduction of my force Lee might very readily have spared some troops from the defences to send West.  I had other objects in view, however, besides keeping Lee where he was.  The mine was constructed and ready to be exploded, and I wanted to take that occasion to carry Petersburg if I could.  It was the object, therefore, to get as many of Lee’s troops away from the south side of the James River as possible.  Accordingly, on the 26th, we commenced a movement with Hancock’s corps and Sheridan’s cavalry to the north side by the way of Deep Bottom, where Butler had a pontoon bridge laid.  The plan, in the main, was to let the cavalry cut loose and, joining with Kautz’s cavalry of the Army of the James, get by Lee’s lines and destroy as much as they could of the Virginia Central Railroad, while, in the mean time, the infantry was to move out so as to protect their rear and cover their retreat back when they should have got through with their work.  We were successful in drawing the enemy’s troops to the north side of the James as I expected.  The mine was ordered to be charged, and the morning of the 30th of July was the time fixed for its explosion.  I gave Meade minute orders (38) on the 24th directing how I wanted the assault conducted, which orders he amplified into general instructions for the guidance of the troops that were to be engaged.

Meade’s instructions, which I, of course, approved most heartily, were all that I can see now was necessary.  The only further precaution which he could have taken, and which he could not foresee, would have been to have different men to execute them.