they had boldly proclaimed their intention to capture Philadelphia, New York, and the National Capital, and had made several attempts to do so, and once or twice had come fearfully near making their boast good—­too near for complacent contemplation by the loyal North.  They had also come near losing their own capital on at least one occasion.  So here was a stand-off.  The campaign now begun was destined to result in heavier losses, to both armies, in a given time, than any previously suffered; but the carnage was to be limited to a single year, and to accomplish all that had been anticipated or desired at the beginning in that time.  We had to have hard fighting to achieve this.  The two armies had been confronting each other so long, without any decisive result, that they hardly knew which could whip.

Ten days’ rations, with a supply of forage and ammunition were taken in wagons.  Beef cattle were driven with the trains, and butchered as wanted.  Three days rations in addition, in haversacks, and fifty rounds of cartridges, were carried on the person of each soldier.

The country over which the army had to operate, from the Rapidan to the crossing of the James River, is rather flat, and is cut by numerous streams which make their way to the Chesapeake Bay.  The crossings of these streams by the army were generally made not far above tide-water, and where they formed a considerable obstacle to the rapid advance of troops even when the enemy did not appear in opposition.  The country roads were narrow and poor.  Most of the country is covered with a dense forest, in places, like the Wilderness and along the Chickahominy, almost impenetrable even for infantry except along the roads.  All bridges were naturally destroyed before the National troops came to them.

The Army of the Potomac was composed of three infantry and one cavalry corps, commanded respectively by Generals W. S. Hancock, G. K. Warren, (27) John Sedgwick and P. H. Sheridan.  The artillery was commanded by General Henry J. Hunt.  This arm was in such abundance that the fourth of it could not be used to advantage in such a country as we were destined to pass through.  The surplus was much in the way, taking up as it did so much of the narrow and bad roads, and consuming so much of the forage and other stores brought up by the trains.

The 5th corps, General Warren commanding, was in advance on the right, and marched directly for Germania Ford, preceded by one division of cavalry, under General J. H. Wilson.  General Sedgwick followed Warren with the 6th corps.  Germania Ford was nine or ten miles below the right of Lee’s line.  Hancock, with the 2d corps, moved by another road, farther east, directly upon Ely’s Ford, six miles below Germania, preceded by Gregg’s division of cavalry, and followed by the artillery.  Torbert’s division of cavalry was left north of the Rapidan, for the time, to picket the river and prevent the enemy from crossing and getting into our rear.  The cavalry seized the two crossings before daylight, drove the enemy’s pickets guarding them away, and by six o’clock A.M. had the pontoons laid ready for the crossing of the infantry and artillery.  This was undoubtedly a surprise to Lee.  The fact that the movement was unopposed proves this.