Personal Memoirs of General U. S. Grant — Complete eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 1,000 pages of information about Personal Memoirs of General U. S. Grant — Complete.

Personal Memoirs of General U. S. Grant — Complete eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 1,000 pages of information about Personal Memoirs of General U. S. Grant — Complete.

At the East, also, the rebels were busy.  I had said to Halleck that Plymouth and Washington, North Carolina, were unnecessary to hold.  It would be better to have the garrisons engaged there added to Butler’s command.  If success attended our arms both places, and others too, would fall into our hands naturally.  These places had been occupied by Federal troops before I took command of the armies, and I knew that the Executive would be reluctant to abandon them, and therefore explained my views; but before my views were carried out the rebels captured the garrison at Plymouth.  I then ordered the abandonment of Washington, but directed the holding of New Berne at all hazards.  This was essential because New Berne was a port into which blockade runners could enter.

General Banks had gone on an expedition up the Red River long before my promotion to general command.  I had opposed the movement strenuously, but acquiesced because it was the order of my superior at the time.  By direction of Halleck I had reinforced Banks with a corps of about ten thousand men from Sherman’s command.  This reinforcement was wanted back badly before the forward movement commenced.  But Banks had got so far that it seemed best that he should take Shreveport on the Red River, and turn over the line of that river to Steele, who commanded in Arkansas, to hold instead of the line of the Arkansas.  Orders were given accordingly, and with the expectation that the campaign would be ended in time for Banks to return A. J. Smith’s command to where it belonged and get back to New Orleans himself in time to execute his part in the general plan.  But the expedition was a failure.  Banks did not get back in time to take part in the programme as laid down.  Nor was Smith returned until long after the movements of May, 1864, had been begun.  The services of forty thousand veteran troops, over and above the number required to hold all that was necessary in the Department of the Gulf, were thus paralyzed.  It is but just to Banks, however, to say that his expedition was ordered from Washington and he was in no way responsible except for the conduct of it.  I make no criticism on this point.  He opposed the expedition.

By the 27th of April spring had so far advanced as to justify me in fixing a day for the great move.  On that day Burnside left Annapolis to occupy Meade’s position between Bull Run and the Rappahannock.  Meade was notified and directed to bring his troops forward to his advance.  On the following day Butler was notified of my intended advance on the 4th of May, and he was directed to move the night of the same day and get as far up the James River as possible by daylight, and push on from there to accomplish the task given him.  He was also notified that reinforcements were being collected in Washington City, which would be forwarded to him should the enemy fall back into the trenches at Richmond.  The same day Sherman was directed to get his forces up ready to advance on the 5th.  Sigel was in Winchester and was notified to move in conjunction with the others.

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Personal Memoirs of General U. S. Grant — Complete from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.