intrepid cavalry general, was in the West with a large force; making a larger command necessary to hold what we had gained in Middle and West Tennessee.  We could not abandon any territory north of the line held by the enemy because it would lay the Northern States open to invasion.  But as the Army of the Potomac was the principal garrison for the protection of Washington even while it was moving on Lee, so all the forces to the west, and the Army of the James, guarded their special trusts when advancing from them as well as when remaining at them.  Better indeed, for they forced the enemy to guard his own lines and resources at a greater distance from ours, and with a greater force.  Little expeditions could not so well be sent out to destroy a bridge or tear up a few miles of railroad track, burn a storehouse, or inflict other little annoyances.  Accordingly I arranged for a simultaneous movement all along the line.  Sherman was to move from Chattanooga, Johnston’s army and Atlanta being his objective points. (23) Crook, commanding in West Virginia, was to move from the mouth of the Gauley River with a cavalry force and some artillery, the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad to be his objective.  Either the enemy would have to keep a large force to protect their communications, or see them destroyed and a large amount of forage and provision, which they so much needed, fall into our hands.  Sigel was in command in the Valley of Virginia.  He was to advance up the valley, covering the North from an invasion through that channel as well while advancing as by remaining near Harper’s Ferry.  Every mile he advanced also gave us possession of stores on which Lee relied.  Butler was to advance by the James River, having Richmond and Petersburg as his objective.

Before the advance commenced I visited Butler at Fort Monroe.  This was the first time I had ever met him.  Before giving him any order as to the part he was to play in the approaching campaign I invited his views.  They were very much such as I intended to direct, and as I did direct (24), in writing, before leaving.

General W. F. Smith, who had been promoted to the rank of major-general shortly after the battle of Chattanooga on my recommendation, had not yet been confirmed.  I found a decided prejudice against his confirmation by a majority of the Senate, but I insisted that his services had been such that he should be rewarded.  My wishes were now reluctantly complied with, and I assigned him to the command of one of the corps under General Butler.  I was not long in finding out that the objections to Smith’s promotion were well founded.