Cleveland and Dalton.  Hooker will at the same time attack, and, if he can, carry Lookout Mountain.  The enemy now seems to be looking for an attack on his left flank.  This favors us.  To further confirm this, Sherman’s advance division will march direct from Whiteside to Trenton.  The remainder of his force will pass over a new road just made from Whiteside to Kelly’s Ferry, thus being concealed from the enemy, and leave him to suppose the whole force is going up Lookout Valley.  Sherman’s advance has only just reached Bridgeport.  The rear will only reach there on the 16th.  This will bring it to the 19th as the earliest day for making the combined movement as desired.  Inform me if you think you can sustain yourself until this time.  I can hardly conceive of the enemy breaking through at Kingston and pushing for Kentucky.  If they should, however, a new problem would be left for solution.  Thomas has ordered a division of cavalry to the vicinity of Sparta.  I will ascertain if they have started, and inform you.  It will be entirely out of the question to send you ten thousand men, not because they cannot be spared, but how would they be fed after they got even one day east from here?”

Longstreet, for some reason or other, stopped at Loudon until the 13th.  That being the terminus of his railroad communications, it is probable he was directed to remain there awaiting orders.  He was in a position threatening Knoxville, and at the same time where he could be brought back speedily to Chattanooga.  The day after Longstreet left Loudon, Sherman reached Bridgeport in person and proceeded on to see me that evening, the 14th, and reached Chattanooga the next day.

My orders for battle were all prepared in advance of Sherman’s arrival (15), except the dates, which could not be fixed while troops to be engaged were so far away.  The possession of Lookout Mountain was of no special advantage to us now.  Hooker was instructed to send Howard’s corps to the north side of the Tennessee, thence up behind the hills on the north side, and to go into camp opposite Chattanooga; with the remainder of the command, Hooker was, at a time to be afterwards appointed, to ascend the western slope between the upper and lower palisades, and so get into Chattanooga valley.

The plan of battle was for Sherman to attack the enemy’s right flank, form a line across it, extend our left over South Chickamauga River so as to threaten or hold the railroad in Bragg’s rear, and thus force him either to weaken his lines elsewhere or lose his connection with his base at Chickamauga Station.  Hooker was to perform like service on our right.  His problem was to get from Lookout Valley to Chattanooga Valley in the most expeditious way possible; cross the latter valley rapidly to Rossville, south of Bragg’s line on Missionary Ridge, form line there across the ridge facing north, with his right flank extended to Chickamauga Valley east of the ridge, thus threatening the enemy’s rear on that flank and compelling him to reinforce this also.  Thomas, with the Army of the Cumberland, occupied the centre, and was to assault while the enemy was engaged with most of his forces on his two flanks.