A day was spent in Louisville, the Secretary giving me the military news at the capital and talking about the disappointment at the results of some of the campaigns.  By the evening of the day after our arrival all matters of discussion seemed exhausted, and I left the hotel to spend the evening away, both Mrs. Grant (who was with me) and myself having relatives living in Louisville.  In the course of the evening Mr. Stanton received a dispatch from Mr. C. A. Dana, then in Chattanooga, informing him that unless prevented Rosecrans would retreat, and advising peremptory orders against his doing so.

As stated before, after the fall of Vicksburg I urged strongly upon the government the propriety of a movement against Mobile.  General Rosecrans had been at Murfreesboro’, Tennessee, with a large and well-equipped army from early in the year 1863, with Bragg confronting him with a force quite equal to his own at first, considering it was on the defensive.  But after the investment of Vicksburg Bragg’s army was largely depleted to strengthen Johnston, in Mississippi, who was being reinforced to raise the siege.  I frequently wrote General Halleck suggesting that Rosecrans should move against Bragg.  By so doing he would either detain the latter’s troops where they were or lay Chattanooga open to capture.  General Halleck strongly approved the suggestion, and finally wrote me that he had repeatedly ordered Rosecrans to advance, but that the latter had constantly failed to comply with the order, and at last, after having held a council of war, had replied in effect that it was a military maxim “not to fight two decisive battles at the same time.”  If true, the maxim was not applicable in this case.  It would be bad to be defeated in two decisive battles fought the same day, but it would not be bad to win them.  I, however, was fighting no battle, and the siege of Vicksburg had drawn from Rosecrans’ front so many of the enemy that his chances of victory were much greater than they would be if he waited until the siege was over, when these troops could be returned.  Rosecrans was ordered to move against the army that was detaching troops to raise the siege.  Finally he did move, on the 24th of June, but ten days afterwards Vicksburg surrendered, and the troops sent from Bragg were free to return.

It was at this time that I recommended to the general-in-chief the movement against Mobile.  I knew the peril the Army of the Cumberland was in, being depleted continually, not only by ordinary casualties, but also by having to detach troops to hold its constantly extending line over which to draw supplies, while the enemy in front was as constantly being strengthened.  Mobile was important to the enemy, and in the absence of a threatening force was guarded by little else than artillery.  If threatened by land and from the water at the same time the prize would fall easily, or troops would have to be sent to its defence.  Those troops would necessarily come from Bragg.  My judgment was overruled, and the troops under my command were dissipated over other parts of the country where it was thought they could render the most service.