Up to this point our movements had been made without serious opposition.  My line was now nearly parallel with the Jackson and Vicksburg railroad and about seven miles south of it.  The right was at Raymond eighteen miles from Jackson, McPherson commanding; Sherman in the centre on Fourteen Mile Creek, his advance thrown across; McClernand to the left, also on Fourteen Mile Creek, advance across, and his pickets within two miles of Edward’s station, where the enemy had concentrated a considerable force and where they undoubtedly expected us to attack.  McClernand’s left was on the Big Black.  In all our moves, up to this time, the left had hugged the Big Black closely, and all the ferries had been guarded to prevent the enemy throwing a force on our rear.

McPherson encountered the enemy, five thousand strong with two batteries under General Gregg, about two miles out of Raymond.  This was about two P.M.  Logan was in advance with one of his brigades.  He deployed and moved up to engage the enemy.  McPherson ordered the road in rear to be cleared of wagons, and the balance of Logan’s division, and Crocker’s, which was still farther in rear, to come forward with all dispatch.  The order was obeyed with alacrity.  Logan got his division in position for assault before Crocker could get up, and attacked with vigor, carrying the enemy’s position easily, sending Gregg flying from the field not to appear against our front again until we met at Jackson.

In this battle McPherson lost 66 killed, 339 wounded, and 37 missing —­nearly or quite all from Logan’s division.  The enemy’s loss was 100 killed, 305 wounded, besides 415 taken prisoners.

I regarded Logan and Crocker as being as competent division commanders as could be found in or out of the army and both equal to a much higher command.  Crocker, however, was dying of consumption when he volunteered.  His weak condition never put him on the sick report when there was a battle in prospect, as long as he could keep on his feet.  He died not long after the close of the rebellion.

CHAPTER XXXV.

MOVEMENT AGAINST JACKSON—­FALL OF JACKSON—­INTERCEPTING THE ENEMY —­BATTLE OF CHAMPION’S HILL.

When the news reached me of McPherson’s victory at Raymond about sundown my position was with Sherman.  I decided at once to turn the whole column towards Jackson and capture that place without delay.

Pemberton was now on my left, with, as I supposed, about 18,000 men; in fact, as I learned afterwards, with nearly 50,000.  A force was also collecting on my right, at Jackson, the point where all the railroads communicating with Vicksburg connect.  All the enemy’s supplies of men and stores would come by that point.  As I hoped in the end to besiege Vicksburg I must first destroy all possibility of aid.  I therefore determined to move swiftly towards Jackson, destroy or drive any force in that direction and then turn upon Pemberton.  But by moving against Jackson, I uncovered my own communication.  So I finally decided to have none—­to cut loose altogether from my base and move my whole force eastward.  I then had no fears for my communications, and if I moved quickly enough could turn upon Pemberton before he could attack me in the rear.