disappointed at receiving a dispatch from Rosecrans after midnight from Jacinto, twenty-two miles from Iuka, saying that some of his command had been delayed, and that the rear of his column was not yet up as far as Jacinto.  He said, however, that he would still be at Iuka by two o’clock the next day.  I did not believe this possible because of the distance and the condition of the roads, which was bad; besides, troops after a forced march of twenty miles are not in a good condition for fighting the moment they get through.  It might do in marching to relieve a beleaguered garrison, but not to make an assault.  I immediately sent Ord a copy of Rosecrans’ dispatch and ordered him to be in readiness to attack the moment he heard the sound of guns to the south or south-east.  He was instructed to notify his officers to be on the alert for any indications of battle.  During the 19th the wind blew in the wrong direction to transmit sound either towards the point where Ord was, or to Burnsville where I had remained.

A couple of hours before dark on the 19th Rosecrans arrived with the head of his column at garnets, the point where the Jacinto road to Iuka leaves the road going east.  He here turned north without sending any troops to the Fulton road.  While still moving in column up the Jacinto road he met a force of the enemy and had his advance badly beaten and driven back upon the main road.  In this short engagement his loss was considerable for the number engaged, and one battery was taken from him.  The wind was still blowing hard and in the wrong direction to transmit sounds towards either Ord or me.  Neither he nor I nor any one in either command heard a gun that was fired upon the battle-field.  After the engagement Rosecrans sent me a dispatch announcing the result.  This was brought by a courier.  There was no road between Burnsville and the position then occupied by Rosecrans and the country was impassable for a man on horseback.  The courier bearing the message was compelled to move west nearly to Jacinto before he found a road leading to Burnsville.  This made it a late hour of the night before I learned of the battle that had taken place during the afternoon.  I at once notified Ord of the fact and ordered him to attack early in the morning.  The next morning Rosecrans himself renewed the attack and went into Iuka with but little resistance.  Ord also went in according to orders, without hearing a gun from the south of town but supposing the troops coming from the south-west must be up by that time.  Rosecrans, however, had put no troops upon the Fulton road, and the enemy had taken advantage of this neglect and retreated by that road during the night.  Word was soon brought to me that our troops were in Iuka.  I immediately rode into town and found that the enemy was not being pursued even by the cavalry.  I ordered pursuit by the whole of Rosecrans’ command and went on with him a few miles in person.  He followed only a few miles after I left him and then went into camp, and the pursuit was continued no further.  I was disappointed at the result of the battle of Iuka—­but I had so high an opinion of General Rosecrans that I found no fault at the time.