General Rosecrans had previously had his headquarters at Iuka, where his command was spread out along the Memphis and Charleston railroad eastward.  While there he had a most excellent map prepared showing all the roads and streams in the surrounding country.  He was also personally familiar with the ground, so that I deferred very much to him in my plans for the approach.  We had cars enough to transport all of General Ord’s command, which was to go by rail to Burnsville, a point on the road about seven miles west of Iuka.  From there his troops were to march by the north side of the railroad and attack Price from the north-west, while Rosecrans was to move eastward from his position south of Corinth by way of the Jacinto road.  A small force was to hold the Jacinto road where it turns to the north-east, while the main force moved on the Fulton road which comes into Iuka further east.  This plan was suggested by Rosecrans.

Bear Creek, a few miles to the east of the Fulton road, is a formidable obstacle to the movement of troops in the absence of bridges, all of which, in September, 1862, had been destroyed in that vicinity.  The Tennessee, to the north-east, not many miles away, was also a formidable obstacle for an army followed by a pursuing force.  Ord was on the north-west, and even if a rebel movement had been possible in that direction it could have brought only temporary relief, for it would have carried Price’s army to the rear of the National forces and isolated it from all support.  It looked to me that, if Price would remain in Iuka until we could get there, his annihilation was inevitable.

On the morning of the 18th of September General Ord moved by rail to Burnsville, and there left the cars and moved out to perform his part of the programme.  He was to get as near the enemy as possible during the day and intrench himself so as to hold his position until the next morning.  Rosecrans was to be up by the morning of the 19th on the two roads before described, and the attack was to be from all three quarters simultaneously.  Troops enough were left at Jacinto and Rienzi to detain any cavalry that Van Dorn might send out to make a sudden dash into Corinth until I could be notified.  There was a telegraph wire along the railroad, so there would be no delay in communication.  I detained cars and locomotives enough at Burnsville to transport the whole of Ord’s command at once, and if Van Dorn had moved against Corinth instead of Iuka I could have thrown in reinforcements to the number of 7,000 or 8,000 before he could have arrived.  I remained at Burnsville with a detachment of about 900 men from Ord’s command and communicated with my two wings by courier.  Ord met the advance of the enemy soon after leaving Burnsville.  Quite a sharp engagement ensued, but he drove the rebels back with considerable loss, including one general officer killed.  He maintained his position and was ready to attack by daylight the next morning.  I was very much