After the capture of Corinth a movable force of 80,000 men, besides enough to hold all the territory acquired, could have been set in motion for the accomplishment of any great campaign for the suppression of the rebellion.  In addition to this fresh troops were being raised to swell the effective force.  But the work of depletion commenced.  Buell with the Army of the Ohio was sent east, following the line of the Memphis and Charleston railroad.  This he was ordered to repair as he advanced —­only to have it destroyed by small guerilla bands or other troops as soon as he was out of the way.  If he had been sent directly to Chattanooga as rapidly as he could march, leaving two or three divisions along the line of the railroad from Nashville forward, he could have arrived with but little fighting, and would have saved much of the loss of life which was afterwards incurred in gaining Chattanooga.  Bragg would then not have had time to raise an army to contest the possession of middle and east Tennessee and Kentucky; the battles of Stone River and Chickamauga would not necessarily have been fought; Burnside would not have been besieged in Knoxville without the power of helping himself or escaping; the battle of Chattanooga would not have been fought.  These are the negative advantages, if the term negative is applicable, which would probably have resulted from prompt movements after Corinth fell into the possession of the National forces.  The positive results might have been:  a bloodless advance to Atlanta, to Vicksburg, or to any other desired point south of Corinth in the interior of Mississippi.

CHAPTER XXVII.

Headquarters moved to Memphis—­on the road to Memphis—­escaping Jackson
—­complaints and requests—­Halleck appointed commander-in-chief—­return
to Corinth—­movements of Bragg—­surrender of Clarksville—­the advance
upon Chattanooga—­Sheridan colonel of A Michigan regiment.

My position at Corinth, with a nominal command and yet no command, became so unbearable that I asked permission of Halleck to remove my headquarters to Memphis.  I had repeatedly asked, between the fall of Donelson and the evacuation of Corinth, to be relieved from duty under Halleck; but all my applications were refused until the occupation of the town.  I then obtained permission to leave the department, but General Sherman happened to call on me as I was about starting and urged me so strongly not to think of going, that I concluded to remain.  My application to be permitted to remove my headquarters to Memphis was, however, approved, and on the 21st of June I started for that point with my staff and a cavalry escort of only a part of one company.  There was a detachment of two or three companies going some twenty-five miles west to be stationed as a guard to the railroad.  I went under cover of this escort to the end of their march, and the next morning proceeded to La Grange with no convoy but the few cavalry men I had with me.