On one occasion during the day I rode back as far as the river and met General Buell, who had just arrived; I do not remember the hour, but at that time there probably were as many as four or five thousand stragglers lying under cover of the river bluff, panic-stricken, most of whom would have been shot where they lay, without resistance, before they would have taken muskets and marched to the front to protect themselves.  This meeting between General Buell and myself was on the dispatch-boat used to run between the landing and Savannah.  It was brief, and related specially to his getting his troops over the river.  As we left the boat together, Buell’s attention was attracted by the men lying under cover of the river bank.  I saw him berating them and trying to shame them into joining their regiments.  He even threatened them with shells from the gunboats near by.  But it was all to no effect.  Most of these men afterward proved themselves as gallant as any of those who saved the battle from which they had deserted.  I have no doubt that this sight impressed General Buell with the idea that a line of retreat would be a good thing just then.  If he had come in by the front instead of through the stragglers in the rear, he would have thought and felt differently.  Could he have come through the Confederate rear, he would have witnessed there a scene similar to that at our own.  The distant rear of an army engaged in battle is not the best place from which to judge correctly what is going on in front.  Later in the war, while occupying the country between the Tennessee and the Mississippi, I learned that the panic in the Confederate lines had not differed much from that within our own.  Some of the country people estimated the stragglers from Johnston’s army as high as 20,000.  Of course this was an exaggeration.

The situation at the close of Sunday was as follows:  along the top of the bluff just south of the log-house which stood at Pittsburg landing, Colonel J. D. Webster, of my staff, had arranged twenty or more pieces of artillery facing south or up the river.  This line of artillery was on the crest of a hill overlooking a deep ravine opening into the Tennessee.  Hurlbut with his division intact was on the right of this artillery, extending west and possibly a little north.  McClernand came next in the general line, looking more to the west.  His division was complete in its organization and ready for any duty.  Sherman came next, his right extending to Snake Creek.  His command, like the other two, was complete in its organization and ready, like its chief, for any service it might be called upon to render.  All three divisions were, as a matter of course, more or less shattered and depleted in numbers from the terrible battle of the day.  The division of W. H. L. Wallace, as much from the disorder arising from changes of division and brigade commanders, under heavy fire, as from any other cause, had lost its organization and did not occupy a place in the line as a division.  Prentiss’ command was gone as a division, many of its members having been killed, wounded or captured, but it had rendered valiant services before its final dispersal, and had contributed a good share to the defence of Shiloh.