When the landing was completed I returned with the transports to Paducah to hasten up the balance of the troops.  I got back on the 5th with the advance the remainder following as rapidly as the steamers could carry them.  At ten o’clock at night, on the 5th, the whole command was not yet up.  Being anxious to commence operations as soon as possible before the enemy could reinforce heavily, I issued my orders for an advance at 11 A.M. on the 6th.  I felt sure that all the troops would be up by that time.

Fort Henry occupies a bend in the river which gave the guns in the water battery a direct fire down the stream.  The camp outside the fort was intrenched, with rifle pits and outworks two miles back on the road to Donelson and Dover.  The garrison of the fort and camp was about 2,800, with strong reinforcements from Donelson halted some miles out.  There were seventeen heavy guns in the fort.  The river was very high, the banks being overflowed except where the bluffs come to the water’s edge.  A portion of the ground on which Fort Henry stood was two feet deep in water.  Below, the water extended into the woods several hundred yards back from the bank on the east side.  On the west bank Fort Heiman stood on high ground, completely commanding Fort Henry.  The distance from Fort Henry to Donelson is but eleven miles.  The two positions were so important to the enemy, as he saw his interest, that it was natural to suppose that reinforcements would come from every quarter from which they could be got.  Prompt action on our part was imperative.

The plan was for the troops and gunboats to start at the same moment.  The troops were to invest the garrison and the gunboats to attack the fort at close quarters.  General Smith was to land a brigade of his division on the west bank during the night of the 5th and get it in rear of Heiman.

At the hour designated the troops and gunboats started.  General Smith found Fort Heiman had been evacuated before his men arrived.  The gunboats soon engaged the water batteries at very close quarters, but the troops which were to invest Fort Henry were delayed for want of roads, as well as by the dense forest and the high water in what would in dry weather have been unimportant beds of streams.  This delay made no difference in the result.  On our first appearance Tilghman had sent his entire command, with the exception of about one hundred men left to man the guns in the fort, to the outworks on the road to Dover and Donelson, so as to have them out of range of the guns of our navy; and before any attack on the 6th he had ordered them to retreat on Donelson.  He stated in his subsequent report that the defence was intended solely to give his troops time to make their escape.

Tilghman was captured with his staff and ninety men, as well as the armament of the fort, the ammunition and whatever stores were there.  Our cavalry pursued the retreating column towards Donelson and picked up two guns and a few stragglers; but the enemy had so much the start, that the pursuing force did not get in sight of any except the stragglers.