“Do you know that?”

“I do,” I replied; “I saw it done.”

That was many years ago.  If asked to-day I should answer less confidently.

A TOUGH TUSSLE

One night in the autumn of 1861 a man sat alone in the heart of a forest in western Virginia.  The region was one of the wildest on the continent—­the Cheat Mountain country.  There was no lack of people close at hand, however; within a mile of where the man sat was the now silent camp of a whole Federal brigade.  Somewhere about—­it might be still nearer—­was a force of the enemy, the numbers unknown.  It was this uncertainty as to its numbers and position that accounted for the man’s presence in that lonely spot; he was a young officer of a Federal infantry regiment and his business there was to guard his sleeping comrades in the camp against a surprise.  He was in command of a detachment of men constituting a picket-guard.  These men he had stationed just at nightfall in an irregular line, determined by the nature of the ground, several hundred yards in front of where he now sat.  The line ran through the forest, among the rocks and laurel thickets, the men fifteen or twenty paces apart, all in concealment and under injunction of strict silence and unremitting vigilance.  In four hours, if nothing occurred, they would be relieved by a fresh detachment from the reserve now resting in care of its captain some distance away to the left and rear.  Before stationing his men the young officer of whom we are writing had pointed out to his two sergeants the spot at which he would be found if it should be necessary to consult him, or if his presence at the front line should be required.

It was a quiet enough spot—­the fork of an old wood-road, on the two branches of which, prolonging themselves deviously forward in the dim moonlight, the sergeants were themselves stationed, a few paces in rear of the line.  If driven sharply back by a sudden onset of the enemy—­and pickets are not expected to make a stand after firing—­the men would come into the converging roads and naturally following them to their point of intersection could be rallied and “formed.”  In his small way the author of these dispositions was something of a strategist; if Napoleon had planned as intelligently at Waterloo he would have won that memorable battle and been overthrown later.

Second-Lieutenant Brainerd Byring was a brave and efficient officer, young and comparatively inexperienced as he was in the business of killing his fellow-men.  He had enlisted in the very first days of the war as a private, with no military knowledge whatever, had been made first-sergeant of his company on account of his education and engaging manner, and had been lucky enough to lose his captain by a Confederate bullet; in the resulting promotions he had gained a commission.  He had been in several engagements, such as they were—­ at Philippi, Rich Mountain,