228.  I hope to be forgiven for discovering that all moral philosophy hitherto has been tedious and has belonged to the soporific appliances—­and that “virtue,” in my opinion, has been more injured by the tediousness of its advocates than by anything else; at the same time, however, I would not wish to overlook their general usefulness.  It is desirable that as few people as possible should reflect upon morals, and consequently it is very desirable that morals should not some day become interesting!  But let us not be afraid!  Things still remain today as they have always been:  I see no one in Europe who has (or discloses) an idea of the fact that philosophizing concerning morals might be conducted in a dangerous, captious, and ensnaring manner—­that Calamity might be involved therein.  Observe, for example, the indefatigable, inevitable English utilitarians:  how ponderously and respectably they stalk on, stalk along (a Homeric metaphor expresses it better) in the footsteps of Bentham, just as he had already stalked in the footsteps of the respectable Helvetius! (no, he was not a dangerous man, Helvetius, ce SENATEUR pococurante, to use an expression of Galiani).  No new thought, nothing of the nature of a finer turning or better expression of an old thought, not even a proper history of what has been previously thought on the subject:  an impossible literature, taking it all in all, unless one knows how to leaven it with some mischief.  In effect, the old English vice called cant, which is moral TARTUFFISM, has insinuated itself also into these moralists (whom one must certainly read with an eye to their motives if one must read them), concealed this time under the new form of the scientific spirit; moreover, there is not absent from them a secret struggle with the pangs of conscience, from which a race of former Puritans must naturally suffer, in all their scientific tinkering with morals. (Is not a moralist the opposite of a Puritan?  That is to say, as a thinker who regards morality as questionable, as worthy of interrogation, in short, as a problem?  Is moralizing not-immoral?) In the end, they all want English morality to be recognized as authoritative, inasmuch as mankind, or the “general utility,” or “the happiness of the greatest number,”—­no! the happiness of England, will be best served thereby.  They would like, by all means, to convince themselves that the striving after English happiness, I mean after comfort and fashion (and in the highest instance, a seat in Parliament), is at the same time the true path of virtue; in fact, that in so far as there has been virtue in the world hitherto, it has just consisted in such striving.  Not one of those ponderous, conscience-stricken herding-animals (who undertake to advocate the cause of egoism as conducive to the general welfare) wants to have any knowledge or inkling of the facts that the “general