impulsion, pressure, resistance, and motion, which usually commence immediately after the act of will; inasmuch as, on the other hand, we are accustomed to disregard this duality, and to deceive ourselves about it by means of the synthetic term “I”:  a whole series of erroneous conclusions, and consequently of false judgments about the will itself, has become attached to the act of willing—­to such a degree that he who wills believes firmly that willing suffices for action.  Since in the majority of cases there has only been exercise of will when the effect of the command—­consequently obedience, and therefore action—­was to be expected, the appearance has translated itself into the sentiment, as if there were a necessity of effect; in a word, he who wills believes with a fair amount of certainty that will and action are somehow one; he ascribes the success, the carrying out of the willing, to the will itself, and thereby enjoys an increase of the sensation of power which accompanies all success.  “Freedom of Will”—­that is the expression for the complex state of delight of the person exercising volition, who commands and at the same time identifies himself with the executor of the order—­ who, as such, enjoys also the triumph over obstacles, but thinks within himself that it was really his own will that overcame them.  In this way the person exercising volition adds the feelings of delight of his successful executive instruments, the useful “underwills” or under-souls—­indeed, our body is but a social structure composed of many souls—­to his feelings of delight as commander.  L’EFFET c’est MOI. what happens here is what happens in every well-constructed and happy commonwealth, namely, that the governing class identifies itself with the successes of the commonwealth.  In all willing it is absolutely a question of commanding and obeying, on the basis, as already said, of a social structure composed of many “souls”, on which account a philosopher should claim the right to include willing-as-such within the sphere of morals—­regarded as the doctrine of the relations of supremacy under which the phenomenon of “life” manifests itself.

20.  That the separate philosophical ideas are not anything optional or autonomously evolving, but grow up in connection and relationship with each other, that, however suddenly and arbitrarily they seem to appear in the history of thought, they nevertheless belong just as much to a system as the collective members of the fauna of a Continent—­is betrayed in the end by the circumstance:  how unfailingly the most diverse philosophers always fill in again a definite fundamental scheme of possible philosophies.  Under an invisible spell, they always revolve once more in the same orbit, however independent of each other they may feel themselves with their critical or systematic wills, something within them leads them, something impels them in definite order the one after