audacious and furious onset was completely broken, though the gallant fellows fell back to their original line doggedly, and not until after they had almost gained the creek.  Ewell was now hemmed in on every side, and all those under his immediate command were captured.  Merritt and Crook had also broken up Anderson by this time, but he himself, and about two thousand disorganized men escaped by making their way through the woods toward the Appomattox River before they could be entirely enveloped.  Night had fallen when the fight was entirely over, but Devin was pushed on in pursuit for about two miles, part of the Sixth Corps following to clinch a victory which not only led to the annihilation of one corps of Lee’s retreating army, but obliged Longstreet to move up to Farmville, so as to take a road north of the Appomattox River toward Lynchburg instead of continuing toward Danville.

At the close of the battle I sent one of my staff—­Colonel Redwood Price—­to General Grant to report what had been done; that we had taken six generals and from nine to ten thousand prisoners.  On his way Price stopped at the headquarters of General Meade, where he learned that not the slightest intelligence of the occurrence on my line had been received, for I not being under Meade’s command, he had paid no attention to my movements.  Price gave the story of the battle, and General Meade, realizing its importance, sent directions immediately to General Wright to make his report of the engagement to the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac, assuming that Wright was operating independently of me in the face of Grant’s despatch Of 2 o’clock, which said that Wright was following the cavalry and would “go in with a vim” wherever I dictated.  Wright could not do else than comply with Meade’s orders in the case, and I, being then in ignorance of Meade’s reasons for the assumption, could say nothing.  But General Grant plainly intending, and even directing, that the corps should be under my command, remedied this phase of the matter, when informed of what had taken place, by requiring Wright to send a report of the battle through me.  What he then did, and what his intentions and orders were, are further confirmed by a reference to the episode in his “Memoirs,” where he gives his reasons for ordering the Sixth Corps to abandon the move on Amelia Court House and pass to the left of the army.  On the same page he also says, referring to the 6th of April:  “The Sixth Corps now remained with the cavalry under Sheridan’s direct command until after the surrender.”  He unquestionably intended all of this, but his purpose was partly frustrated by General Meade’s action next morning in assuming direction of the movements of the corps; and before General Grant became aware of the actual conditions the surrender was at hand.

CHAPTER VIII.