About 4 o’clock Warren began the attack.  He was to assault the left flank of the Confederate infantry at a point where I knew Pickett’s intrenchments were refused, almost at right angles with the White Oak road.  I did not know exactly how far toward Hatcher’s Run this part of the works extended, for here the videttes of Mumford’s cavalry were covering, but I did know where the refusal began.  This return, then, was the point I wished to assail, believing that if the assault was made with spirit, the line could be turned.  I therefore intended that Ayres and Crawford should attack the refused trenches squarely, and when these two divisions and Merritt’s cavalry became hotly engaged, Griffin’s division was to pass around the left of the Confederate line; and I personally instructed Griffin how I wished him to go in, telling him also that as he advanced, his right flank would be taken care of by Mackenzie, who was to be pushed over toward the Ford road and Hatcher’s Run.

The front of the corps was oblique to the White Oak road; and on getting there, it was to swing round to the left till perpendicular to the road, keeping closed to the left.  Ayres did his part well, and to the letter, bringing his division square up to the front of the return near the angle; but Crawford did not wheel to the left, as was intended.  On the contrary, on receiving fire from Mumford’s cavalry, Crawford swerved to the right and moved north from the return, thus isolating his division from Ayres; and Griffin, uncertain of the enemy’s position, naturally followed Crawford.

The deflection of this division on a line of march which finally brought it out on the Ford road near C. Young’s house, frustrated the purpose I had in mind when ordering the attack, and caused a gap between Ayres and Crawford, of which the enemy quickly took advantage, and succeeded in throwing a part of Ayres’s division into confusion.  At this juncture I sent word to General Warren to have Crawford recalled; for the direction he was following was not only a mistaken one, but, in case the assault at the return failed, he ran great risk of capture.  Warren could not be found, so I then sent for Griffin—­first by Colonel Newhall, and then by Colonel Sherman—­to come to the aid of Ayres, who was now contending alone with that part of the enemy’s infantry at the return.  By this time Griffin had observed and appreciated Crawford’s mistake, however, and when the staff-officers reached him, was already faced to the left; so, marching across Crawford’s rear, he quickly joined Ayres, who meanwhile had rallied his troops and carried the return.

When Ayres’s division went over the flank of the enemy’s works, Devin’s division of cavalry, which had been assaulting the front, went over in company with it; and hardly halting to reform, the intermingling infantry and dismounted cavalry swept down inside the intrenchments, pushing to and beyond Five Forks, capturing thousands of prisoners.  The only stand the enemy tried to make was when he attempted to form near the Ford road.  Griffin pressed him so hard there, however, that he had to give way in short order, and many of his men, with three pieces of artillery, fell into the hands of Crawford while on his circuitous march.