On the 19th of June the rebel army again fell back on its flanks, to such an extent that for a time I supposed it had retreated to the Chattahoochee River, fifteen miles distant; but as we pressed forward we were soon undeceived, for we found it still more concentrated, covering Marietta and the railroad.  These successive contractions of the enemy’s line encouraged us and discouraged him, but were doubtless justified by sound reasons.  On the 20th Johnston’s position was unusually strong.  Kenesaw Mountain was his salient; his two flanks were refused and covered by parapets and by Noonday and Nose’s Creeks.  His left flank was his weak point, so long as he acted on the “defensive,” whereas, had he designed to contract the extent of his line for the purpose of getting in reserve a force with which to strike “offensively” from his right, he would have done a wise act, and I was compelled to presume that such was his object:  We were also so far from Nashville and Chattanooga that we were naturally sensitive for the safety of our railroad and depots, so that the left (McPherson) was held very strong.

About this time came reports that a large cavalry force of the enemy had passed around our left flank, evidently to strike this very railroad somewhere below Chattanooga.  I therefore reenforced the cavalry stationed from Resaca to Casaville, and ordered forward from Huntsville, Alabama, the infantry division of General John E. Smith, to hold Kingston securely.

While we were thus engaged about Kenesaw, General Grant had his hands full with Lee, in Virginia.  General Halleck was the chief of staff at Washington, and to him I communicated almost daily.  I find from my letter-book that on the 21st of June I reported to him tersely and truly the condition of facts on that day:  “This is the nineteenth day of rain, and the prospect of fair weather is as far off as ever.  The roads are impassable; the fields and woods become quagmire’s after a few wagons have crossed over.  Yet we are at work all the time.  The left flank is across Noonday Creek, and the right is across Nose’s Creek.  The enemy still holds Kenesaw, a conical mountain, with Marietta behind it, and has his flanks retired, to cover that town and the railroad behind.  I am all ready to attack the moment the weather and roads will permit troops and artillery to move with any thing like life.”

The weather has a wonderful effect on troops:  in action and on the march, rain is favorable; but in the woods, where all is blind and uncertain, it seems almost impossible for an army covering ten miles of front to act in concert during wet and stormy weather.  Still I pressed operations with the utmost earnestness, aiming always to keep our fortified lines in absolute contact with the enemy, while with the surplus force we felt forward, from one flank or the other, for his line of communication and retreat.  On the 22d of June I rode the whole line, and ordered General Thomas in person to advance his extreme right corps (Hooker’s); and instructed General Schofield, by letter, to keep his entire army, viz., the Twenty-third Corps, as a strong right flank in close support of Hooker’s deployed line.  During this day the sun came out, with some promise of clear weather, and I had got back to my bivouac about dark, when a signal message was received, dated—­