McPherson is ordered to assemble the Fifteenth Corps near Larkin’s, and to get the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Corps (Dodge and Blair) at Decatur at the earliest possible moment.  From these two points he will direct his forces on Lebanon, Summerville, and Lafayette, where he will act against Johnston, if he accept battle at Dalton; or move in the direction of Rome, if the enemy give up Dalton, and fall behind the Oostenaula or Etowah.  I see that there is some risk in dividing our forces, but Thomas and Schofield will have strength enough to cover all the valleys as far as Dalton; and, should Johnston turn his whole force against McPherson, the latter will have his bridge at Larkin’s, and the route to Chattanooga via Willa’s Valley and the Chattanooga Creek, open for retreat; and if Johnston attempt to leave Dalton, Thomas will have force enough to push on through Dalton to Kingston, which will checkmate him.  My own opinion is that Johnston will be compelled to hang to his railroad, the only possible avenue of supply to his army, estimated at from forty-five to sixty thousand men.

At Lafayette all our armies will be together, and if Johnston stands at Dalton we must attack him in position.  Thomas feels certain that he has no material increase of force, and that he has not sent away Hardee, or any part of his army.  Supplies are the great question.  I have materially increased the number of cars daily.  When I got here, the average was from sixty-five to eighty per day.  Yesterday the report was one hundred and ninety-three; to-day, one hundred and thirty-four; and my estimate is that one hundred and forty-five cars per day will give us a day’s supply and a day’s accumulation.

McPherson is ordered to carry in wagons twenty day’s rations, and to rely on the depot at Ringgold for the renewal of his bread.  Beeves are now being driven on the hoof to the front; and the commissary, Colonel Beckwith, seems fully alive to the importance of the whole matter.

Our weakest point will be from the direction of Decatur, and I will be forced to risk something from that quarter, depending on the fact that the enemy has no force available with which to threaten our communications from that direction.

Colonel Comstock will explain to you personally much that I cannot commit to paper.  I am, with great respect,

W. T. Sherman, Major-General.

On the 28th of April I removed my headquarters to Chattanooga, and prepared for taking the field in person.  General Grant had first indicated the 30th of April as the day for the simultaneous advance, but subsequently changed the day to May 5th.  McPhersons troops were brought forward rapidly to Chattanooga, partly by rail and partly by marching.  Thomas’s troops were already in position (his advance being out as far as Ringgold-eighteen miles), and Schofield was marching down by Cleveland to Red Clay and Catoosa Springs.  On the 4th of May, Thomas was in person at Ringgold, his left at Catoosa, and his right at Leet’s Tan-yard.  Schofield was at Red Clay, closing upon Thomas’s left; and McPherson was moving rapidly into Chattanooga, and out toward Gordon’s Mill.