are quick to note the smallest signs of corrupt transactions; and no sophistry will persuade the best of them out of their good instincts.  You could not have made the directors of the Bank of England do the sort of business which ‘Overends’ at last did, except by a moral miracle—­except by changing their nature.  And the fatal career of the Bank of the United States would, under their management, have been equally impossible.  Of the ultimate solvency of the Bank of England, or of the eventual safety of its vast capital, even at the worst periods of its history, there has not been the least doubt.

But nevertheless, as we have seen, the policy of the Bank has frequently been deplorable, and at such times the defects of its government have aggravated if not caused its calamities.

In truth the executive of the Bank of England is now much such as the executive of a public department of the Foreign Office or the Home Office would be in which there was no responsible permanent head.  In these departments of Government, the actual chief changes nearly, though not quite, as often as the Governor of the Bank of England.  The Parliamentary Under-Secretary—­the Deputy-Governor, so to speak, of that office—­changes nearly as often.  And if the administration solely, or in its details, depended on these two, it would stop.  New men could not carry it on with vigour and efficiency; indeed they could not carry it on at all.  But, in fact, they are assisted by a permanent Under-Secretary, who manages all the routine business, who is the depository of the secrets of the office, who embodies its traditions, who is the hyphen between changing administrations.  In consequence of this assistance, the continuous business of the department is, for the most part, managed sufficiently well, notwithstanding frequent changes in the heads of administration.  And it is only by such assistance that such business could be so managed.  The present administration of the Bank is an attempt to manage a great, a growing, and a permanently continuous business without an adequate permanent element, and a competent connecting link.

In answer, it may be said that the duties which press on the Governor and Deputy-Governor of the Bank are not so great or so urgent as those which press upon the heads of official departments.  And perhaps, in point of mere labour, the Governor of the Bank has the advantage.  Banking never ought to be an exceedingly laborious trade.  There must be a great want of system and a great deficiency in skilled assistance if extreme labour is thrown upon the chief.  But in importance, the functions of the head of the Bank rank as high as those of any department.  The cash reserve of the country is as precious a deposit as any set of men can have the care of.  And the difficulty of dealing with a panic (as the administration of the Bank is forced to deal with it) is perhaps a more formidable instant difficulty than presses upon any single minister.  At any rate, it comes more suddenly, and must be dealt with more immediately, than most comparable difficulties; and the judgment, the nerve, and the vigour needful to deal with it are plainly rare and great.