of business in which they are engaged, and give an anxious opinion on it.  Most of them have a good deal of leisure, for the life of a man of business who employs only his own capital, and employs it nearly always in the same way, is by no means fully employed.  Hardly any capital is enough to employ the principal partner’s time, and if such a man is very busy, it is a sign of something wrong.  Either he is working at detail, which subordinates would do better, and which he had better leave alone, or he is engaged in too many speculations, is incurring more liabilities than his capital will bear, and so may be ruined.  In consequence, every commercial city abounds in men who have great business ability and experience, who are not fully occupied, who wish to be occupied, and who are very glad to become directors of public companies in order to be occupied.  The direction of the Bank of England has, for many generations, been composed of such men.

Such a government for a joint stock company is very good if its essential nature be attended to, and very bad if that nature be not attended to.  That government is composed of men with a high average of general good sense, with an excellent knowledge of business in general, but without any special knowledge of the particular business in which they are engaged.  Ordinarily, in joint stock banks and companies this deficiency is cured by the selection of a manager of the company, who has been specially trained to that particular trade, and who engages to devote all his experience and all his ability to the affairs of the company.  The directors, and often a select committee of them more especially, consult with the manager, and after hearing what he has to say, decide on the affairs of the company.  There is in all ordinary joint stock companies a fixed executive specially skilled, and a somewhat varying council not specially skilled.  The fixed manager ensures continuity and experience in the management, and a good board of directors ensures general wisdom.

But in the Bank of England there is no fixed executive.  The Governor and Deputy-Governor, who form that executive, change every two years.  I believe, indeed, that such was not the original intention of the founders.  In the old days of few and great privileged companies, the chairman, though periodically elected, was practically permanent so long as his policy was popular.  He was the head of the ministry, and ordinarily did not change unless the opposition came in.  But this idea has no present relation to the constitution of the Bank of England.  At present, the Governor and Deputy-Governor almost always change at the end of two years; the case of any longer occupation of the chair is so very rare, that it need not be taken account of.  And the Governor and Deputy-Governor of the Bank cannot well be shadows.  They are expected to be constantly present; to see all applicants for advances out of the ordinary routine; to carry on