The age is a primary matter.  The offices of Governor and Deputy-Governor are given in rotation.  The Deputy-Governor always succeeds the Governor, and usually the oldest director who has not been m office becomes Deputy-Governor.  Sometimes, from personal reasons, such as ill-health or special temporary occupation, the time at which a director becomes Deputy-Governor may be a little deferred, and, in some few cases, merchants in the greatest business have been permitted to decline entirely.  But for all general purposes, the rule may be taken as absolute.  Save in rare cases, a director must serve his time as Governor and Deputy-Governor nearly when his turn comes, and he will not be asked to serve much before his turn.  It is usually about twenty years from the time of a man’s first election that he arrives, as it is called, at the chair.  And as the offices of Governor and Deputy-Governor are very important, a man who fills them should be still in the vigour of life.  Accordingly, Bank directors, when first chosen by the board, are always young men.

At first this has rather a singular effect; a stranger hardly knows what to make of it.  Many years since, I remember seeing a very fresh and nice-looking young gentleman, and being struck with astonishment at being told that he was a director of the Bank of England.  I had always imagined such directors to be men of tried sagacity and long experience, and I was amazed that a cheerful young man should be one of them.  I believe I thought it was a little dangerous.  I thought such young men could not manage the Bank well.  I feared they had the power to do mischief.

Further inquiry, however, soon convinced me that they had not the power.  Naturally, young men have not much influence at a board where there, are many older members.  And in the Bank of England there is a special provision for depriving them of it if they get it.  Some of the directors, as I have said, retire annually, but by courtesy it is always the young ones.  Those who have passed the chair—­that is, who have served the office of Governor—­always remain.  The young part of the board is the fluctuating part, and the old part is the permanent part; and therefore it is not surprising that the young part has little influence.  The Bank directors may be blamed for many things, but they cannot be blamed for the changeableness and excitability of a neocracy.

Indeed, still better to prevent it, the elder members of the board that is, those who have passed the chairform a standing committee of indefinite powers, which is called the Committee of Treasury.  I say ‘indefinite powers,’ for I am not aware that any precise description has ever been given of them, and I doubt if they can be precisely described.  They are sometimes said to exercise a particular control over the relations and negotiations between the Bank and the Government.  But I confess that I believe that this varies very much with the character of the Governor for the time being.  A strong Governor does much mainly upon his own responsibility, and a weak Governor does little.  Still the influence of the Committee of Treasury is always considerable, though not always the same.  They form a a cabinet of mature, declining, and old men, just close to the executive; and for good or evil such a cabinet must have much power.