The amount of the advance is the main consideration for the Bank of England, and not the nature of the security on which the advance is made, always assuming the security to be good.  An idea prevails (as I believe) at the Bank of England that they ought not to advance during a panic on any kind of security on which they do not commonly advance.  But if bankers for the most part do advance on such security in common times, and if that security is indisputably good, the ordinary practice of the Bank of England is immaterial.  In ordinary times the Bank is only one of many lenders, whereas in a panic it is the sole lender, and we want, as far as we can, to bring back the unusual state of a time of panic to the common state of ordinary times.

In common opinion there is always great uncertainty as to the conduct of the Bank:  the Bank has never laid down any clear and sound policy on the subject.  As we have seen, some of its directors (like Mr. Hankey) advocate an erroneous policy.  The public is never sure what policy will be adopted at the most important moment:  it is not sure what amount of advance will be made, or on what security it will be made.  The best palliative to a panic is a confidence in the adequate amount of the Bank reserve, and in the efficient use of that reserve.  And until we have on this point a clear understanding with the Bank of England, both our liability to crises and our terror at crises will always be greater than they would otherwise be.

CHAPTER VIII.

The Government of the Bank of England.

The Bank of England is governed by a board of directors, a Governor, and a Deputy-Governor; and the mode in which these are chosen, and the time for which they hold office, affect the whole of its business.  The board of directors is in fact self-electing.  In theory a certain portion go out annually, remain out for a year, and are subject to re-election by the proprietors.  But in fact they are nearly always, and always if the other directors wish it, re-elected after a year.  Such has been the unbroken practice of many years, and it would be hardly possible now to break it.  When a vacancy occurs by death or resignation, the whole board chooses the new member, and they do it, as I am told, with great care.  For a peculiar reason, it is important that the directors should be young when they begin; and accordingly the board run over the names of the most attentive and promising young men in the old-established firms of London, and select the one who, they think, will be most suitable for a bank director.  There is a considerable ambition to fill the office.  The status which is given by it, both to the individual who fills it and to the firm of merchants to which he belongs, is considerable.  There is surprisingly little favour shown in the selection; there is a great wish on the part of the Bank directors for the time being to provide, to the best of their ability, for the future good government of the Bank.  Very few selections in the world are made with nearly equal purity.  There is a sincere desire to do the best for the Bank, and to appoint a well-conducted young man who has begun to attend to business, and who seems likely to be fairly sensible and fairly efficient twenty years later.