If we examine the manner in which the Bank of England has fulfilled these duties, we shall find, as we found before, that the true principle has never been grasped; that the policy has been inconsistent; that, though the policy has much improved, there still remain important particulars in which it might be better than it is.  The first panic of which it is necessary here to speak, is that of 1825:  I hardly think we should derive much instruction from those of 1793 and 1797; the world has changed too much since; and during the long period of inconvertible currency from 1797 to 1819, the problems to be solved were altogether different from our present ones.  In the panic of 1825, the Bank of England at first acted as unwisely as it was possible to act.  By every means it tried to restrict its advances.  The reserve being very small, it endeavoured to protect that reserve by lending as little as possible.  The result was a period of frantic and almost inconceivable violence; scarcely any one knew whom to trust; credit was almost suspended; the country was, as Mr. Huskisson expressed it, within twenty-four hours of a state of barter.  Applications for assistance were made to the Government, but though it was well known that the Government refused to act, there was not, as far as I know, until lately any authentic narrative of the real facts.  In the ‘Correspondence’ of the Duke of Wellington, of all places in the world, there is a full account of them.  The Duke was then on a mission at St. Petersburg, and Sir R. Peel wrote to him a letter of which the following is a part:  ’We have been placed in a very unpleasant predicament on the other question—­the issue of Exchequer Bills by Government.  The feeling of the City, of many of our friends, of some of the Opposition, was decidedly in favour of the issue of Exchequer Bills to relieve the merchants and manufacturers.

’It was said in favour of the issue, that the same measure had been tried and succeeded in 1793 and 1811.  Our friends whispered about that we were acting quite in a different manner from that in which Mr. Pitt did act, and would have acted had he been alive.

’We felt satisfied that, however plausible were the reasons urged in favour of the issue of Exchequer Bills, yet that the measure was a dangerous one, and ought to be resisted by the Government.

’There are thirty millions of Exchequer Bills outstanding.  The purchases lately made by the Bank can hardly maintain them at par.  If there were a new issue to such an amount as that contemplated viz., five millions—­there would be a great danger that the whole mass of Exchequer Bills would be at a discount, and would be paid into the revenue.  If the new Exchequer Bills were to be issued at a different rate of interest from the outstanding onessay bearing an interest of five per cent—­the old ones would be immediately at a great discount unless the interest were raised.  If the interest were raised, the charge on the revenue would be of