But can we expect such a king, or, for that is the material point, can we expect a lineal series of such kings?  Every one has heard the reply of the Emperor Alexander to Madame de Stael, who favoured him with a declamation in praise of beneficent despotism.  “Yes, Madame, but it is only a happy accident.”  He well knew that the great abilities and the good intentions necessary to make an efficient and good despot never were continuously combined in any line of rulers.  He knew that they were far out of reach of hereditary human nature.  Can it be said that the characteristic qualities of a constitutional monarch are more within its reach?  I am afraid it cannot.  We found just now that the characteristic use of an hereditary constitutional monarch, at the outset of an administration, greatly surpassed the ordinary competence of hereditary faculties.  I fear that an impartial investigation will establish the same conclusion as to his uses during the continuance of an administration.

If we look at history, we shall find that it is only during the period of the present reign that in England the duties of a constitutional sovereign have ever been well performed.  The first two Georges were ignorant of English affairs, and wholly unable to guide them, whether well or ill; for many years in their time the Prime Minister had, over and above the labour of managing Parliament, to manage the woman—­sometimes the queen, sometimes the mistress—­who managed the sovereign; George III. interfered unceasingly, but he did harm unceasingly; George IV. and William IV. gave no steady continuing guidance, and were unfit to give it.  On the Continent, in first-class countries, constitutional royalty has never lasted out of one generation.  Louis Philippe, Victor Emmanuel, and Leopold are the founders of their dynasties; we must not reckon in constitutional monarchy any more than in despotic monarchy on the permanence in the descendants of the peculiar genius which founded the race.  As far as experience goes, there is no reason to expect an hereditary series of useful limited monarchs.

If we look to theory, there is even less reason to expect it.  A monarch is useful when he gives an effectual and beneficial guidance to his Ministers.  But these Ministers are sure to be among the ablest men of their time.  They will have had to conduct the business of Parliament so as to satisfy it; they will have to speak so as to satisfy it.  The two together cannot be done save by a man of very great and varied ability.  The exercise of the two gifts is sure to teach a man much of the world; and if it did not, a Parliamentary leader has to pass through a magnificent training before he becomes a leader.  He has to gain a seat in Parliament; to gain the ear of Parliament; to gain the confidence of Parliament; to gain the confidence of his colleagues.  No one can achieve these—­no one, still more, can both achieve them and retain them—­without a singular ability, nicely trained in the varied detail