But will it be so exercised?  A constitutional sovereign must in the common course of government be a man of but common ability.  I am afraid, looking to the early acquired feebleness of hereditary dynasties, that we must expect him to be a man of inferior ability.  Theory and experience both teach that the education of a prince can be but a poor education, and that a royal family will generally have less ability than other families.  What right have we then to expect the perpetual entail on any family of an exquisite discretion, which if it be not a sort of genius, is at least as rare as genius?

Probably in most cases the greatest wisdom of a constitutional king would show itself in well-considered inaction.  In the confused interval between 1857 and 1859 the Queen and Prince Albert were far too wise to obtrude any selection of their own.  If they had chosen, perhaps they would not have chosen Lord Palmerston.  But they saw, or may be believed to have seen, that the world was settling down without them, and that by interposing an extrinsic agency, they would but delay the beneficial crystallisation of intrinsic forces.  There is, indeed, a permanent reason which would make the wisest king, and the king who feels most sure of his wisdom, very slow to use that wisdom.  The responsibility of Parliament should be felt by Parliament.  So long as Parliament thinks it is the sovereign’s business to find a Government it will be sure not to find a Government itself.  The royal form of Ministerial government is the worst of all forms if it erect the subsidiary apparatus into the principal force, if it induce the assembly which ought to perform paramount duties to expect some one else to perform them.

It should be observed, too, in fairness to the unroyal species of Cabinet government, that it is exempt from one of the greatest and most characteristic defects of the royal species.  Where there is no Court there can be no evil influence from a Court.  What these influences are every one knows; though no one, hardly the best and closest observer, can say with confidence and precision how great their effect is.  Sir Robert Walpole, in language too coarse for our modern manners, declared after the death of Queen Caroline, that he would pay no attention to the king’s daughters ("those girls,” as he called them), but would rely exclusively on Madame de Walmoden, the king’s mistress.  “The king,” says a writer in George IV.’s time, “is in our favour, and what is more to the purpose, the Marchioness of Conyngham is so too.”  Everybody knows to what sort of influences several Italian changes of Government since the unity of Italy have been attributed.  These sinister agencies are likely to be most effective just when everything else is troubled, and when, therefore, they are particularly dangerous.  The wildest and wickedest king’s mistress would not plot against an invulnerable administration.  But very many will intrigue when Parliament is perplexed, when parties are divided, when alternatives are many, when many evil things are possible, when Cabinet government must be difficult.