head an incapable nonentity, the Whig party would probably have been exiled from office at the Schleswig-Holstein difficulty.  The nation would have deserted them, and Parliament would have deserted them, too; neither would have endured to see a secret negotiation, on which depended the portentous alternative of war or peace, in the hands of a person who was thought to be weak—­who had been promoted because of his mediocrity—­whom his own friends did not respect.  A Ministerial government, too, is carried on in the face of day.  Its life is in debate.  A President may be a weak man; yet if he keep good Ministers to the end of his administration, he may not be found out—­it may still be a dubious controversy whether he is wise or foolish.  But a Prime Minister must show what he is.  He must meet the House of Commons in debate; he must be able to guide that assembly in the management of its business, to gain its ear in every emergency, to rule it in its hours of excitement.  He is conspicuously submitted to a searching test, and if he fails he must resign.

Nor would any party like to trust to a weak man the great power which a Cabinet government commits to its Premier.  The Premier, though elected by Parliament can dissolve Parliament.  Members would be naturally anxious that the power which might destroy their coveted dignity should be lodged in fit hands.  They dare not place in unfit hands a power which, besides hurting the nation, might altogether ruin them.  We may be sure, therefore, that whenever the predominant party is divided, the un-royal form of Cabinet government would secure for us a fair and able Parliamentary leader--that it would give us a good Premier, if not the very best.  Can it be said that the royal form does more?

In one case I think it may.  If the constitutional monarch be a man of singular discernment, of unprejudiced disposition, and great political knowledge, he may pick out from the ranks of the divided party its very best leader, even at a time when the party, if left to itself, would not nominate him.  If the sovereign be able to play the part of that thoroughly intelligent but perfectly disinterested spectator who is so prominent in the works of certain moralists, he may be able to choose better for his subjects than they would choose for themselves.  But if the monarch be not so exempt from prejudice, and have not this nearly miraculous discernment, it is not likely that he will be able to make a wiser choice than the choice of the party itself.  He certainly is not under the same motive to choose wisely.  His place is fixed whatever happens, but the failure of an appointing party depends on the capacity of their appointee.