At the beginning of an administration there would not be much difference between the royal and unroyal species of Cabinet governments when there were only two great parties in the State, and when the greater of those parties was thoroughly agreed within itself who should be its Parliamentary leader, and who therefore should be its Premier.  The sovereign must now accept that recognised leader; and if the choice were directly made by the House of Commons, the House must also choose him; its supreme section, acting compactly and harmoniously, would sway its decisions without substantial resistance, and perhaps without even apparent competition.  A predominant party, rent by no intestine demarcation, would be despotic.  In such a case Cabinet government would go on without friction whether there was a Queen or whether there was no Queen.  The best sovereign could then achieve no good, and the worst effect no harm.

But the difficulties are far greater when the predominant party is not agreed who should be its leader.  In the royal form of Cabinet government the sovereign then has sometimes a substantial selection; in the unroyal, who would choose?  There must be a meeting at “Willis’s Rooms”; there must be that sort of interior despotism of the majority over the minority within the party, by which Lord John Russell in 1859 was made to resign his pretensions to the supreme government, and to be content to serve as a subordinate to Lord Palmerston.  The tacit compression which a party anxious for office would exercise over leaders who divided its strength, would be used and must be used.  Whether such a party would always choose precisely the best man may well be doubted.  In a party once divided it is very difficult to secure unanimity in favour of the very person whom a disinterested bystander would recommend.  All manner of jealousies and enmities are immediately awakened, and it is always difficult, often impossible, to get them to sleep again.  But though such a party might not select the very best leader, they have the strongest motives to select a very good leader.  The maintenance of their rule depends on it Under a Presidential Constitution the preliminary caucuses which choose the President need not care as to the ultimate fitness of the man they choose.  They are solely concerned with his attractiveness as a candidate; they need not regard his efficiency as a ruler.  If they elect a man of weak judgment, he will reign his stated term; even though he show the best judgment, at the end of that term there will be by constitutional destiny another election.  But under a Ministerial government there is no such fixed destiny.  The Government is a removable Government, its tenure depends upon its conduct.  If a party in power were so foolish as to choose a weak man for its head, it would cease to be in power.  Its judgment is its life.  Suppose in 1859 that the Whig party had determined to set aside both Earl Russell and Lord Palmerston and to choose for its