The best mode of testing what we owe to the Queen is to make a vigorous effort of the imagination, and see how we should get on without her.  Let us strip Cabinet government of all its accessories, let us reduce it to its two necessary constituents—­a representative assembly (a House of Commons) and a Cabinet appointed by that assembly—­and examine how we should manage with them only.  We are so little accustomed to analyse the Constitution; we are so used to ascribe the whole effect of the Constitution to the whole Constitution, that a great many people will imagine it to be impossible that a nation should thrive or even live with only these two simple elements.  But it is upon that possibility that the general imitability of the English Government depends.  A monarch that can be truly reverenced, a House of Peers that can be really respected, are historical accidents nearly peculiar to this one island, and entirely peculiar to Europe.  A new country, if it is to be capable of a Cabinet government, if it is not to degrade itself to Presidential government, must create that Cabinet out of its native resources—­must not rely on these Old World debris.

Many modes might be suggested by which a Parliament might do in appearance what our Parliament does in reality, viz., appoint a Premier.  But I prefer to select the simplest of all modes.  We shall then see the bare skeleton of this polity, perceive in what it differs from the royal form, and be quite free from the imputation of having selected an unduly charming and attractive substitute.

Let us suppose the House of Commons—­existing alone and by itself—­ to appoint the Premier quite simply, just as the shareholders of a railway choose a director.  At each vacancy, whether caused by death or resignation, let any member or members have the right of nominating a successor; after a proper interval, such as the time now commonly occupied by a Ministerial crisis, ten days or a fortnight, let the members present vote for the candidate they prefer; then let the Speaker count the votes, and the candidate with the greatest number be Premier.  This mode of election would throw the whole choice into the hands of party organisation, just as our present mode does, except in so far as the Crown interferes with it; no outsider would ever be appointed, because the immense number of votes which every great party brings into the field would far outnumber every casual and petty minority.  The Premier should not be appointed for a fixed time, but during good behaviour or the pleasure of Parliament.  Mutatis mutandis, subject to the differences now to be investigated, what goes on now would go on then.  The Premier then, as now, must resign upon a vote of want of confidence, but the volition of Parliament would then be the overt and single force in the selection of a successor, whereas it is now the predominant though latent force.

It will help the discussion very much if we divide it into three parts.  The whole course of a representative Government has three stages—­first, when a Ministry is appointed; next, during its continuance; last, when it ends.  Let us consider what is the exact use of the Queen at each of these stages, and how our present form of government differs in each, whether for good or for evil from that simpler form of Cabinet government which might exist without her.