make the laws, there will be a controversy between the two sets of persons.  The tax-imposers are sure to quarrel with the tax-requirers.  The executive is crippled by not getting the laws it needs, and the legislature is spoiled by having to act without responsibility:  the executive becomes unfit for its name, since it cannot execute what it decides on; the legislature is demoralised by liberty, by taking decisions of which others (and not itself) will suffer the effects.

In America so much has this difficulty been felt that a semi-connection has grown up between the legislature and the executive.  When the Secretary of the Treasury of the Federal Government wants a tax he consults upon it with the chairman of the Financial Committee of Congress.  He cannot go down to Congress himself and propose what he wants; he can only write a letter and send it.  But he tries to get a chairman of the Finance Committee who likes his tax;—­through that chairman he tries to persuade the committee to recommend such tax; by that committee he tries to induce the house to adopt that tax.  But such a chain of communications is liable to continual interruptions; it may suffice for a single tax on a fortunate occasion, but will scarcely pass a complicated budget—­we do not say in a war or a rebellion—­we are now comparing the Cabinet system and the Presidential system in quiet times—­but in times of financial difficulty.  Two clever men never exactly agreed about a budget.  We have by present practice an Indian Chancellor of the Exchequer talking English finance at Calcutta, and an English one talking Indian finance in England.  But the figures are never the same, and the views of policy are rarely the same.  One most angry controversy has amused the world, and probably others scarcely less interesting are hidden in the copious stores of our Anglo-Indian correspondence.

But relations something like these must subsist between the head of a finance committee in the legislature, and a finance Minister in the executive. [Footnote:  It is worth observing that even during the short existence of the Confederate Government these evils distinctly showed themselves.  Almost the last incident at the Richmond Congress was an angry financial correspondence with Jefferson Davis.] They are sure to quarrel, and the result is sure to satisfy neither.  And when the taxes do not yield as they were expected to yield, who is responsible?  Very likely the Secretary of the Treasury could not persuade the chairman—­very likely the chairman could not persuade his committee—­very likely the committee could not persuade the assembly.  Whom, then, can you punish—­whom can you abolish—­when your taxes run short?  There is nobody save the legislature, a vast miscellaneous body difficult to punish, and the very persons to inflict the punishment.  Nor is the financial part of administration the only one which requires in a civilised age the constant support and accompaniment