were frightened by the probable issue of unlimited inconvertible paper, and they would not lend a shilling.  Much more than the mercantile credit of America was thus lost.  The great commercial houses in England are the most natural and most effectual conveyers of intelligence from other countries to Europe.  If they had been financially interested in giving in a sound report as to the progress of the war, a sound report we should have had.  But as the Northern States raised no loans in Lombard Street (and could raise none because of their vicious paper money), Lombard Street did not care about them, and England was very imperfectly informed of the progress of the civil struggle, and on the whole matter, which was then new and very complex, England had to judge without having her usual materials for judgment, and (since the guidance of the “City” on political matter is very quietly and imperceptibly given) without knowing she had not those materials.  Of course, this error might have been committed, and perhaps would have been committed under a Parliamentary government.  But if it had, its effects would ere long have been thoroughly searched into and effectually frustrated.  The whole force of the greatest inquiring machine and the greatest discussing machine which the world has ever known would have been directed to this subject.  In a year or two the American public would have had it forced upon them in every form till they must have comprehended it.  But under the Presidential form of government, and owing to the inferior power of generating discussion, the information given to the American people has been imperfect in the extreme.  And in consequence, after nearly ten years of painful experience, they do not now understand how much they have suffered from their inconvertible currency.

But the mode in which the Presidential government of America managed its taxation during the Civil War, is even a more striking example of its defects.  Mr. Wells tells us:—­

“In the outset all direct or internal taxation was avoided, there having been apparently an apprehension on the part of Congress, that inasmuch as the people had never been accustomed to it, and as all machinery for assessment and collection was wholly wanting, its adoption would create discontent, and thereby interfere with a vigorous prosecution of hostilities.  Congress, therefore, confined itself at first to the enactment of measures looking to an increase of revenue from the increase of indirect taxes upon imports; and it was not until four months after the actual outbreak of hostilities that a direct tax of $20,000,000 per annum was apportioned among the States, and an income tax of 3 per cent. on the excess of all incomes over $800 was provided for; the first being made to take effect practically eight, and the second ten months after date of enactment.  Such laws of course took effect, and became immediately operative in the loyal States only, and produced but comparatively