election and at many future elections. It would
break their career. No English majority dare vote
for an exceedingly bad treaty; it would rather desert
its own leader than ensure its own ruin. And
an English minority, inheriting a long experience of
Parliamentary affairs, would not be exceedingly ready
to reject a treaty made with a foreign Government.
The leaders of an English Opposition are very conversant
with the school-boy maxim, “Two can play at
that fun”. They know that the next time
they are in office the same sort of sharp practice
may be used against them, and therefore they will
not use it. So strong is this predisposition,
that not long since a subordinate member of the Opposition
declared that the “front benches” of the
two sides of the House—that is, the leaders
of the Government and the leaders of the Opposition—were
in constant tacit league to suppress the objections
of independent members. And what he said is often
quite true. There are often seeming objections
which are not real objections; at least, which are,
in the particular cases, outweighed by counter-considerations;
and these “independent members,” having
no real responsibility, not being likely to be hurt
themselves if they make a mistake, are sure to blurt
out, and to want to act upon. But the responsible
heads of the party who may have to decide similar
things, or even the same things themselves, will not
permit it. They refuse, out of interest as well
as out of patriotism, to engage the country in a permanent
foreign scrape, to secure for themselves and their
party a momentary home advantage. Accordingly,
a Government which negotiated a treaty would feel
that its treaty would be subject certainly to a scrutiny,
but still to a candid and lenient scrutiny; that it
would go before judges, of whom the majority were
favourable, and among whom the most influential part
of the minority were in this case much opposed to
excessive antagonism. And this seems to be the
best position in which negotiators can be placed,
namely, that they should be sure to have to account
to considerate and fair persons, but not to have to
account to inconsiderate and unfair ones. At present
the Government which negotiates a treaty can hardly
be said to be accountable to any one. It is sure
to be subjected to vague censure. Benjamin Franklin
said, “I have never known a peace made, even
the most advantageous, that was not censured as inadequate,
and the makers condemned as injudicious or corrupt.
‘Blessed are the peace-makers’ is, I suppose,
to be understood in the other world, for in this they
are frequently cursed.” And this is very
often the view taken now in England of treaties.
There being nothing practical in the Opposition—nothing
likely to hamper them hereafter—the leaders
of Opposition are nearly sure to suggest every objection.
The thing is done and cannot be undone, and the most
natural wish of the Opposition leaders is to prove
that if they had been in office, and it therefore